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Raymond Bullard was two and a half years old when he was removed
from his foster home, where he had lived happily for two years with a
white family, to be placed with a black family. Raymond was taken from
the only home he had known because the Philadelphia Department of
Human Services had a policy against long-term interracial foster care and
adoption placements. The removal was in no way attributed to the qual-
ity of care provided by Raymond's foster parents. Two years later, Ray-
mond was diagnosed as clinically depressed. His speech impediment had
grown worse and he displayed excessive aggression and preoccupation
with death. Only after this diagnosis was made did the federal district
court return Raymond to his initial foster home.'
Though Raymond's story is an exceptional one, it illustrates the sig-
nificance race is accorded in child-placement decisions. Though no one
intended to hurt Raymond, the child suffered tremendous emotional
trauma as a result of the separation from his family due to concern about
the color of his skin. Many children today are wallowing in unstable fos-
ter or institutional care rather than being placed with adoptive parents of
another race. A child's race or cultural heritage are permissible factors
for consideration in the determination of the best interests of the child.
2
Race-matching, however, is often valued above the immediate placement
of children in permanent homes. Raymond's case introduces the compli-
cated issues that arise from the consideration of race in the best interests
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analysis and the resistance to transracial placements in the adoption con-
text.
This Note uses affirmative action jurisprudence to explore the prob-
lems arising from the consideration of race in adoption and discusses
whether the race-conscious federal adoption subsidy, which is given to
adults wanting to adopt minority and other hard-to-place children, is a
permissible means of encouraging the adoption of minority children.
Adoption agencies and social workers resist making transracial adoption
even though their resistance often precludes or delays the child's place-
ment. The barriers imposed by bureaucratic decision-making are linked
to the broader race issues being debated in the affirmative action context.
Advocacy of the elimination of barriers to transracial adoption may seem
inconsistent with support of the adoption subsidy-the first lessens, the
importance of race, and the second underscores its significance. None-
theless, both target the placement of children in permanent homes and
aim to further the interests of the child. This Note analogizes racial dis-
crimination in child placement to racial discrimination in the admissions
and employment context and concludes that affirmative action measures
are an appropriate remedy.
Part I of this Note presents an overview the problem: Disproportion-
ate number of black children await adoption and black children endure
longer waiting periods than do other children. Part II of this Note surveys
the law on transracial adoption and examines the trend toward removal
of barriers to transracial adoptions. Part III uses analogies to affirmative
action cases addressing the benign use of racial classifications to explore
the constitutionality of the federal adoption statute authorizing the sub-
sidization of adults wanting to adopt minority and other hard-to-place
children. Part IV focuses on current trends in affirmative action law and
contemplates whether the subsidy would be found legal if the principles
of Hopwood v. Texas or Wittmer v. Peters4 were embraced by the Su-
preme Court. The discussion reveals that the subsidy probably would
pass constitutional muster if either approach became the law of the land.
The Note ultimately advocates the federal adoption subsidy as a means
of advancing the interests of minority children, concluding that the sub-
sidy is constitutional given past discrimination by state actors charged
with making child-placement decisions.
This Note builds upon a practical rather than idealistic position re-
garding the proper weight to be given to race in child placement deci-
sions. Race and culture are indeed significant to a child's identity and af-
fect her human experience in numerous ways. There is an intimate
3. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
4. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
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connection between race, culture, and identity that shapes the way the
child thinks about and perceives herself, others, and the world around
her. There is no doubt that a black child raised in a white family and a
black child raised in a black family will have distinct experiences. It also
is highly likely that a black child raised in a white family will experience,
to some extent, societal pressures, confusion about identity, and tension
between the two worlds to which she belongs. These additional complica-
tions exacerbate the difficulties facing all minorities in American society.
Nonetheless, given the current crisis involving the disproportionate
numbers of black children in need of permanent homes, transracial adop-
tions should be advocated. Race should never factor into a placement de-
termination when the result is leaving a child in foster or institutional
care. If there are no same-race parents with whom to place a child, the
child should be placed immediately with adoptive parents of a different
race. Put simply, race should never preclude or delay an adoptive place-
ment for any period of time.
Race should be a factor in placement decisions in only one instance-
when there are qualified black and white prospective parents waiting to
adopt. In this circumstance, children should be assigned on a same-race
basis. Given the stark reality that black children are adopted at a lower
rate than are white children, we must grapple with the difficult issue of
transracial adoption when same-race parents are not immediately avail-
able. The goal in adoption should be finding immediate, permanent
homes for children. Children need families in which to grow and develop
in a normal, healthy manner. The choice between making a transracial
placement and waiting for a black family to become available to adopt a
minority child should be easy-the transracial placement should be
made, and the child should be given a home and family to call her own.
A. The Statistical Imbalance
Both the elimination of barriers to nonminority couples' adoption of
minority children and the provision of a federal adoption subsidy are use-
ful social policies. Both facilitate the location of permanent homes for the
disproportionate numbers of minority children in the foster care system.
The severity of the gap in placement rates between minority and nonmi-
nority children is a driving force in the transracial adoption controversy
that warrants attention. Approximately forty-seven percent of the chil-
dren waiting to be adopted are of color and forty percent are categorized
as black, though blacks constitute only twelve percent of the U.S. popula-
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tion.s On average, minority children wait two years before being matched
with a parent, twice as long as nonminority children.'
In 1995, Senator Howard Metzenbaum found that nearly 500,000
children were in foster care in the United States. Of these children, black
children waiting to be adopted waited approximately twice as long as
non-black children, who waited a median length of two years and eight
months.3 Because it is more difficult to find families willing to adopt older
children, a child's chances of ever receiving a permanent placement de-
crease the longer a child remains in foster care. 9
In 1991, the National Adoption Center's statistics revealed that 31%
of families waiting to adopt were black and 67% were white. ' Yet a sur-
vey by the National Center for Health Statistics concluded that only 7.6%
of adoptions reported by women were transracial, of which 1.2% in-
volved a white mother and a black child." To be sure, many prospective
adoptive parents are not interested in adopting across racial lines. Those
who are, however, often encounter bureaucratic resistance that stems
5. See Nancy E. Rowan, Interracial Adoption Part of Welfare Fight, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1995, at All (quoting Rep. Jim Bunning, supporter of 1996 Adoption Promotion and Stability
Act, which would bar race-based discrimination in adoption, as stating that because forty per-
cent of the children in foster care but only twelve percent of Americans are black, minority
children languish in foster homes); see also SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND
FAMILIES, No PLACE TO CALL HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No.
101-395, at 7, 38 (1990); CONSTANCE POHL & KATHY HARRIS, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 62
(1992). There are few statistics available on the percentages and races of children waiting to be
adopted, because the federal government stopped gathering statistics in 1975, the year the
United States National Center for Social Statistics issued its last report on adoption. See Eliza-
beth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163, 1174 n.10 (1991) (citing Joan H. Hollinger, Introduction to Law and
Practice, in ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 1-52 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1988)). More recent
statistics are based on information collected on a voluntary basis from state substitute care sys-
tems. See id. (citing Telephone Interview with Dr. Toshio Totara, Director of the Research and
Demonstration Department of the American Public Welfare Association (Jan. 29, 1991)).
6. See Bartholet, supra note 5 at 1201.
7. Minority children constitute approximately half of the population in the foster care sys-
tem in the United States. The situation is worse in New York City, where in 1993 black children
comprised almost 90% of the foster care population; see Judith K. McKenzie, Adoption of Chil-
dren with Special Needs, THE FYrTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 62,69. Although this Note
primarily focuses on black children, who currently face the longest waiting periods, many of the
relevant studies and statistics treat all minority children. In addition, many of the issues dis-
cussed throughout the Note apply to both black and nonblack minority children. For these rea-
sons, reference will be made to both black and minority children.
8. See Carla M. Curtis & Rudolph Alexander, The Multiethnic Placement Act: Implications
for Social Work Practice, 13 CHILD AND ADOLESCENT Soc. WORK J. 401, 403 (1996) (quoting
Department of Health and Human Services guidelines, 1995).
9. See NATIONAL COMM. FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACrBOOK 176,191 (1989).
10. See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1187 n.62.
11. See RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, ADOPTION, RACE, AND IDENTITY: FROM
INFANCY THROUGH ADOLESCENCE 14 & nA8 (1992) (quoting CHRISTINE A. BACHRACH ET
AL., ADOPTION IN THE 1980s 5-7, 1989). Of the transracial adoptions reported in the survey,
1.2% involved a white mother and a black child, 4.8% involved a white mother and a child of a
race other than black, most of which were Korean and Latin American, and 1.6% involved a
white child and a mother of another race.
Vol. 17:201, 1998
Transracial Adoption
from personal or agency prejudices. These prejudices, furthermore, have
been exacerbated by the continuing resistance of the National Associa-
tion of Black Social Workers (NABSW) to transracial adoption. 12 A
black child's chance of being adopted has already suffered as a result of
the 1972 release by the NABSW of a position statement that referred to
transracial adoption as "cultural genocide."'3 After the group announced
its position, many groups shifted their policies and the number of transra-
cial placements plummeted. 14
Adoption agency policies often make race the central factor in the
placement process." Whites who have expressed an interest in adopting
older black children with significant disabilities have been turned away
from public adoption agencies. 6 Despite the need to find homes for mi-
nority children and the potentially large number of white parents wanting
to adopt a child of another race, children are often shifted between fos-
ter care situations, left to remain in institutions, or subjected to unneces-
sary delays in permanent placements. This is due, in part, to institutional
aversion to transracial adoptions. Transracial adoptions take place more
frequently in private adoption agencies, where many barriers present in
the state adoption process do not exist." Though public agencies are li-
censed by the state and run by state or city governments, there is minimal
state regulation of private adoption agencies.' 9 Therefore, private agen-
cies are free to exclude race from consideration as they make placement
decisions.20
12. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF
PARENTING 97-98 (1993) (detailing interviews with directors of adoption agencies who de-
scribed prejudices of state and agency bureaucrats and also pressure from NABSW chapter
when placing children transracially).
13. The NABSW statement was presented at the organization's national conference held in
Tennessee on April 4-9, 1972.
14. For a full discussion, see infra Section II.A.
15. See BARTHOLET, supra note 12, at 107 (1993).
16. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Race Separatism in the Family: More on the Transracial Adop-
tion Debate, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 99, 101 (1995) (quoting JAMES BREAY,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., WHO ARE THE WArrING CHILDREN? AN OVERVIEW OF THE
ADOPTION SERV. SYSTEM IN THE MASS. DEPT. OF SOC. SERVS. 17 tbl. 3.3 (1994)).
". See Davidson M. Pattiz, Racial Preference in Adoption: An Equal Protection Challenge,
82 GEO. L.J. 2571, 2601 (1994) (citing Simon & Altstein study (presented in TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIES, infra note 61) revealing that approximately 68,000 of the two
million whites waiting to adopt indicated that they would adopt transracially if given the oppor-
tunity).
18. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Private Race Preferences in Family Formation, 107 YALE L.J.
2351, 2355 (1998) (correspondence).
19. See Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring for Our Own: Why American Adoption Law and Pol-
icy Must Change, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 327,329 (1997).
20. Several authors have discussed the great discretion exercised by adoption placement
officials and the vagueness of the best interests standard. See, e.g., Chip Chiles, A Hand To
Rock the Cradle: Transracial Adoption, the Multiethnic Placement Act, and a Proposalfor the
Arkansas General Assembly, 49 ARK. L. REV. 501, 518 (1996); Barbara McLaughlin, Transra-
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Social workers and adoption agencies wield a great deal of power in
the adoption process. Courts view adoption agencies as the experts at
discerning what is in a child's best interest.21 Social workers have filled a
gap "between a couple's desire to adopt and a court's ability to deter-
mine whether petitioners would indeed be adequate parents. '"' Social
workers serve as "advocate[s] for couples who want[] to adopt and for
women and institutions who want[] to surrender their children."3 Some
studies have revealed that a social worker's race is one of the strongest
factors affecting her attitude towards transracial adoption.24 Black social
workers disapprove of transracial adoption more often than white social
workers.2
Private biases and hostility towards transracial placements are not
wholly to blame, however, for the statistical imbalance of minority chil-
dren needing homes. Other factors contributing to the disproportionate
numbers of minority children waiting for homes include societal percep-
tions of the importance of biological similarity within the family, the
malleability of the law governing the consideration of race by bureau-
crats, and the fact that many black adults today cannot meet the financial
prerequisites adopted by the states for adopting children. The lack of
guidance from the Supreme Court regarding the proper role of race in
placement decisions and the lack of concrete federal law in this area also
contribute to the problem.26 Regardless of the cause, this problem de-
mands immediate attention.
B. Efforts To Resolve the Imbalance
In recent years, various methods have been suggested or employed to
redress the disproportionate numbers of minority children in the foster
system. Some argue that race should not be a permissible factor in find-
ing homes for children and advocate legislation requiring color-blind
adoptions. Others argue that the criteria applied to white prospective
cialAdoption in New York State, 60 ALB. L. REV. 501,519-20 (1996); Rebecca Varan, Desegre-
gating the Adoptive Family: In Support of the Adoption Anti-Discrimination Act of 1995,30 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 593,604 (1997).
21. See McLaughlin, supra note 19,60 ALB. L. REV., at 519.
22. SIMON AND ALTSTEIN, supra note 11, at 1.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 10, 12 (citing Anne Stern Farber, Attitudes of Social Workers toward Re-
quests for Transracial Adoption (1972) (unpublished research project, University of Maryland
School of Social Work); Dawn Day Wachtel, White Social Workers and the Adoption of Black
Children (1973) (unpublished manuscript).
25. See id. at 10, 12.
26. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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parents should not be used when searching for a black adoptive family.27
The black community itself has initiated recruitment programs to en-
courage more black families to adopt black children.2 All states have also
instituted adoption assistance programs that make payments to parents
who would like to adopt but are financially restricted from doing so.29 In
addition, all states have enacted adoption subsidy statutes that provide
monetary subsidies for families that adopt "special needs" or "hard to
place" children.30
II. THE HISTORY AND ELIMINATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION
A. Historical and Legal Development of Transracial Adoption
An examination of the development of transracial adoption policies
illustrates how ingrained race-based decision-making is in the adoption
process. The matching principle, which holds that the adopted child and
his or her parents should be paired according to physical, emotional, in-
tellectual, and cultural characteristics, has always dominated adoption
proceedings. Racial matching policies are based on the idea that what is
"natural" in the context of the biological family is what is normal and de-
sirable in the context of adoption.3 Placement decision-makers have long
been concerned with placing children with physically similar parents.
Primary emphasis has always been on race and religion, however, and
identical religious backgrounds were initially deemed essential to child
placements. In fact, a transreligious adoption controversy preceded the
present controversy surrounding transracial adoption.33
27. See Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10
HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 39, 41 (1993). Fenton argues, for example, that, because black families
are often headed by single parents, single-parent adoptions should be encouraged rather than
rejected. See id. at 63.
28. See Michelle M. Mini, Note, Breaking Down the Barriers to Transracial Adoptions: Can
the Multiethnic Placement Act Meet This Challenge?, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 897, 926-27 (1994).
29. See SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, supra note 5, at 45.
30. See Jane Patterson Auld, Racial Matching vs. Transracial Adoption: Proposing a Com-
promise in the Best Interests of Minority Children, 27 FAM. L.Q. 447,453 (1993) (citing JOAN H.
HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE §9-A.01 (1990)). Congress enacted the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act in 1980 to encourage states to subsidize the adop-
tion of children with special needs by matching state subsidies with federal dollars. See Pub. L.
No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
31. See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1172-73.
32. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Beyond Biology: The Politics of Adoption & Reproduction, 2
DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 8 (1995).
33. See SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 11, at 1-2.
Yale Law & Policy Review
The 1960s was a decade of increased acceptance of transracial adop-
tion. This increase has been attributed to numerous factors including the
1960s Civil Rights Movement, 4 clinical data identifying the effects of ma-
ternal deprivation on infants' psychological development," the passage of
laws mandating reporting of suspected child abuse and neglect,36 an in-
creased awareness of the deficiencies of the foster care system,37 identifi-
cation of the battered child syndrome by the medical profession,38 an in-
sufficient number of minority homes available for minority children in
need of placement, and a dramatic decline in the number of healthy
white infants available for adoption.39 The year 1971 marked the peak of
transracial adoption levels: 2574 black children were placed with white
families and 4846 black children were placed in black families.
The NABSW's denunciation in 1972 of the practice of transracial
adoption 41 halted the increase in transracial adoptions.42 The NABSW's
vigorous attack against transracial adoptions, which it labeled a form of
34. See Ruth-Arlene Howe, Transracial Adoption: Old Prejudices and Discrimination Float
Under a New Halo, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 409, 444-45 (1997).
35. Foster care is especially detrimental to children because many children in the foster
care system are subjected to multiple placements. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 837 (1977) (stating that nearly 60% of children in foster care in New York City
have experienced more than one placement and approximately 28% have experienced three or
more placements). Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, child psychiatrists whose
developmental theories have been influential among child care workers and with courts, assert
that children need a continuous and stable relationship with an adult caretaker for adequate
development to occur. Placement decisions must safeguard the child's need for continuity of
care, because interruptions in continuity result in the child's emotional attachments becoming
increasingly shallow and indiscriminate. Placement decisions should also protect the psycho-
logical parent relationship whenever one already exists or someone seeks to provide this rela-
tionship to the child for whom it is lacking. The term "psychological parent" refers to the adult
with whom a child forms emotional attachments that are necessary for healthy growth. This
adult can be anyone who cares for the child and does not need to be a child's biological parent.
See J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIE: BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3-40 (1996).
36. See Howe, supra note 34, at 445. These mandatory reporting laws brought a greater
number of black families in contact with the child welfare authorities. See id. at 445-46. Howe
does not advocate transracial adoptions and criticizes the fact that authorities' preferred re-
sponse to problems in black families caused by poverty has been to remove black children from
their homes and to place them in foster care.
37. See Cynthia R. Mabry, "Love Alone is Not Enough! in Transracial Adoptions-
Scrutinizing Recent Statutes, Agency Policies, and Prospective Adoptive Parents," 42 WAYNE
L. REv. 1347, 1351 (1996).
38. See Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interest Standard, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 505 (1984) (citing Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181
AM. MED. ASS'N. J. 17 (1962)).
39. See Howard, supra note 38, at 509.
40. See Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children: A Case
Study of Expert Discretion, in 1 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 265, 284-85 (R. Simon ed.,
1978).
41. COMPREHENSIVE BLACK CHILD AND FAMILY COMM., NAT. ASS'N OF BLACK Soc.
WORKERS, POSITION PAPER 14-15 (1972). See supra note 13and accompanying text.
42. Carla M. Curtis & Rudolph Alexander, Jr., The Multiethnic Placement Act: Implications
for Social Work Practice, CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SOCIAL WORK J., Oct. 1996, at 401,401-02.
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"genocide," resulted in a 30% decrease in the practice over the course of
one year.43 In its position paper, the NABSW stated that
Black children should be placed only with black families whether in fos-
ter care or adoption. Black children belong physically, psychologically and
culturally in Black families in order that they receive the total sense of them-
selves and develop a sound protection of their future .... Black children in
white homes are cut off from the healthy development of themselves as
Black people.... Without a change in policy, our children will not have the
background and knowledge which is necessary to survive in a racist society.
This is impossible if the child is placed with white parents in a white envi-
ronment.
We [the members of the NABSW] have committed ourselves toho back
to our communities and work to end this particular form of genocide.
The NABSW thus advanced two primary reasons for its opposition to
transracial adoption: it prevents black'children from forming a strong ra-
cial identity and it precludes the development of survival skills necessary
to deal with a racist society. The publication of this denunciation had an
enormous impact on the positions of many other influential groups and
caused many agencies to reconsider their use of transracial adoptions and
to weigh the practice's social, political and cultural consequences for the
child.45 The "objections raised by the NABSW have undoubtedly been
the most influential in shaping policies which discourage the practice of
transracial adoption."46 Both adoption agencies and social workers
changed their positions to accommodate that of "this outspoken and rela-
tively unchallenged group of Black professionals." 47 After the release of
the statement, many agencies "either established same race placements
or used the NABSW report to justify existing race-matching policies.,
4 s
The position of the Child Welfare League, for example, radically al-
tered, from encouraging to discouraging transracial adoptions: "It is pref-
erable to place children in families of their own racial background. 49 The
43. See RITA SIMON & HOWARD ALSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION: A FOLLOW UP 55-
56 (1981) (illustrating the rapid decline in numbers of transracial adoptees after 1972). The
number of transracial adoptions decreased from 1569 in the year 1972 to 1091 in the year 1973,
to a mere 831 in the year 1975. See id.
44. COMPREHENSIVE BLACK CHILD AND FAMILY COMM., supra note 13; see also Bartholet,
supra note 5, at 97 (quoting National Association of Black Social Workers, "Preserving Black
Families: Research and Action Beyond the Rhetoric," February 1986, p. 31).
45. See J. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES: ADOPTING ACROSS RACIAL BOUNDARIES 75
(1977).
46. Carol G. Goforth, What Is She? How Race Matters and Why It Shouldn't, 46 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 44 (1996).
47. Note, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification in America and Its Impli-
cations for TransracialAdoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531, 551 (1994).
48. Cynthia R. Mabry, supra note 37, at 1353.
49. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE §4.5
(1973). A 1988 version of the same document stated that "[c]hildren in need of adoption have a
right to be placed in a family that reflects their ethnicity or race. Children should not have their
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
advocates race- matching when possible, but prefers transracial adoption
as an alternative to foster care:
If there are black families available and suitable under the criteria of ad-
vancing the "best interest of the child," black children should be placed with
such black families. If black families are not available for placement of black
children, transracial adoption ought to be pursued as a viable and preferred
alternative to keeping such children in foster homes. 
5 o
Today the NABSW continues to advocate racial matching but acquiesces
to transracial adoptions made "after documented evidence of unsuccess-
ful same race placements has been reviewed and supported by appropri-
ate representatives of the African-American community."'" Although the
views of the NABSW are not empirically justified, they remain highly in-
fluential.5 2 The NABSW's position paper raised objections to and con-
cern about the development of transracial adoptees. The principal draw-
back asserted by those who oppose transracial adoption is that such
placements cause the child to lose his or her sense of cultural and ethnic
identity. Some argue that black children need black parents to learn how
to cope with living in a racist society. 3 Others focus on the detrimental
effect on the black community as a whole 4 Ruth Arlene Howe, a race-
matching advocate, underscores the group interests of the black commu-
nity and views transracial adoption as the commodification of black chil-
dren to satisfy white demand:
adoption denied or significantly delayed, however, when adoptive parents of other racial groups
are available." CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE
§ 4.5 (rev. ed. 1988).
50. Memorandum from Benjamin L. Hooks, Executive Director, NAACP, to All NAACP
Units, National Board Members, and NAACP/SCF Trustees 7 (June 3, 1992), reprinted in Note,
Transracial Adoption in Light of the Foster Care Crisis: A Horse of a Different Color, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 147,176 n.226 (1992).
51. In April 1994, the NABSW announced that:
Family preservation, reunification and adoption should work in tandem toward finding
permanent homes for children. Priority should be given to preserving families through
the reunification or adoption of children withlby biological relatives. If that should fail,
secondary priority should be given to the placement of a child within his own race.
Transracial adoption of an African-American child should only be considered after
documented evidence of unsuccessful same race placements has been reviewed and
supported by appropriate representatives of the African-American community. Under
no circumstance should successful same race placements be impeded by obvious barri-
ers (i.e., legal limits of states, state boundaries, fees, surrogate payments, intrusive ap-
plications, lethargic court systems, inadequate staffing patterns, etc.).
See Varan, supra note 20, at 625 n.94 (1997).
52. See Jane Maslow Cohen, Race-Based Matching in a Post-Loving Frame, 6 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 653, 656 (1997) (stating that the arguments for race-matching are offered normatively
and that the arguments are neither proven nor empirically justified).
53. See David S. Rosettenstein, Trans-racial Adoption and the Statutory Preference
Schemes: Before the "Best Interests" and After the "Melting Pot," 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 137, 142
(1994) (discussing the views of opponents of transracial adoption).
54. See id. at 144.
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By according no legitimacy to the group interests of African-Americans and
focusing just on the individual rights of African-American children, these le-
gal champions assure a supply of children to meet the market demands of
white adults seeking to parent whatever children they select. These actions
rob African-Americans of the privilege and responsibility of caring for their
own children. No group can be assured continued existence and vitality if it
does not bear and rear its own children.55
Howe also fears that as a result of transracial adoptions, prospective
black applicants will be discriminated against, out-bid in the market
place, or screened out by agency staff. 6
Until recently, several states had matching or holding policies
authorizing the delay of transracial placements for periods ranging from
three months to several years. Holding policies sometimes require that a
definite period of time pass before a transracial adoption be considered,
usually one of between three and eighteen months. Other holding poli-
cies require that an agency hold a child until it can be proven, usually
with documentation, that active efforts to recruit minority parents have
failed." The latter type of policy may result in even longer delays. Cali-
fornia, for example, required a ninety-day waiting period after a child
was given up for adoption before she could be considered for placement
across racial or ethnic boundaries. The law imposed additional qualifica-
tions by requiring documentation that a "diligent search" using all ap-
propriate resources and strategies had been made for a same-race place-
ment." Similarly, Arizona's "Policy of Placement of Children of Families
of the Same Ethnic or Racial Background" included both a matching and
a holding policy. 9 Nevada and Missouri had similar policies, with holding
periods of three and six months, respectively.6°
Today, only Arkansas and Minnesota maintain matching or prefer-
ence policies that require preference for adoptions within the same racial
61group. These two states establish a hierarchy of preference, placing
adoptions by a blood relative at the top, followed by adoptions of a fam-
55. Howe, supra note 34 at 409, 417 (1997).
56. Id. at 471.
57. See BARTHOLET, supra note 12, at 96-97.
58. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 276-276(2) (West Supp. 1991), amended by CAL. CIrV. CODE §§
222.35,222.37 (West Supp. 1991).
59. The Arizona policy outlined the order in which its same-race preference placements
must be followed, mandating that adoptive parents of the same racial or ethnic background be
sought first, followed by a two parent family in which one parent was of the child's racial or eth-
nic background. "Intensive recruitment efforts are required, and after 90 days and the docu-
mented unavailability of a family of the child's background, other families may be considered."
PATRICIA WILSON-COKER, OFFICE OF POLICY AND MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF TRANS-
RACIAL ADOPTION IN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 72-73 (1988).
60. See BARTHOLET, supra note 12, at 96-97.
61. See Rita J. Simon and Howard Altstein, TheRelevance of Race in Adoption Law and
Social Practice, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 171, 174 (1997).
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ily with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child, with adoptions by
a family of a different race who is knowledgeable and appreciative of the
child's racial or ethnic heritage at the bottom.62 Most state statutes are
silent as to the role of race in the adoption process. Eight states provide
that the race of the parties shall be included in the adoption petition or
listed in the court-ordered investigation, but do not detail how this in-
formation may be used in the placement decision.63 Consistent with the
federal law, eight other states prohibit the use of race to delay or deny an
adoption placement. 64
Evidence exists that the separation into black and white groups is
only a preliminary step of the matching process for many adoption agen-
cies. Black children may be classified subsequently by skin tone and ac-
cordingly placed in light, medium, or dark skinned categories, in the
hopes of being matched with a parent in the complementary group.
These types of policies are subject to criticism, for increasing the time
that children languish in foster care.
B. The Best Interests Standard and the "Relevant-But-Not-Decisive"
Rule
Although the purpose of adoption and foster care is generally under-
stood as an effort to advance the welfare of the child, there is little
agreement as to how this goal should be accomplished. The best interests
standard is widely accepted today in forty-one states and the District of
Columbia as the proper standard to be followed in adoption and other
child-placement contexts. The fact that the best interests standard is a
subjective one allows placement decision-makers too much discretion,
however, enabling them to abuse the power entrusted to them by privi-
leging consideration of race over other factors. Adoption agencies, social
workers, and courts are free to incorporate whatever characteristics they
deem relevant into the decision-making process, and, for the most part,
to assign any amount of weight they desire to those characteristics.
The existence of statutes prohibiting complete reliance on race indi-
cates that racial considerations are deeply embedded in child-placement
decisions and suggests that placement decision-makers tend to prioritize
race above other factors. Elizabeth Bartholet underscores the immense
resistance to transracial adoption: "Although agencies are generally
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
259.29 (West Supp. 1997).
63. The District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, and South
Carolina have statutes of this sort. See SIMON AND ALTSTEIN, supra note 61, at 173.
64. California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Wisconsin have statutes of this type. See id.
65. See BARTHOLET, supra note 5, at 95.
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somewhat more willing to consider transracial adoption for... children
[with severe disabilities and older children], they are still likely to treat it
at best as a last-resort option to be considered only after minority fami-
lies have been recruited and appropriate waiting periods exhausted." 
66
A vast literature has been published on the best interests standard
and all the competing interests included in that framework. In general,
that standard holds that child-placement decisions must enhance the wel-
fare of the child. Little guidance is provided by most state legislatures as
to how any one factor of the child's welfare should be considered. Some
states do, however, have statutes prohibiting the denial of an adoption on
the basis of an adopting parent's marital status or because of a difference
in race, color, or religion between a prospective adopting parent and the
child to be adopted.67
Although the best interests standard has been praised for maximizing
the well-being of the child and for permitting decision-makers to account
for individual circumstances,6 it also has been criticized for being subjec-
tive and vague and for permitting the consideration of political and social
ends that are unrelated to the welfare of the child 9 Margaret Howard
identifies competing interests that are often considered under the best in-
terests standard: a child's interest in his or her cultural identity as a mem-
ber of a minority group, child-placement agencies' organizational inter-
ests, the minority group's interest in continuing as a discrete group, and
the child's interest in being part of a stable and permanent family.70 How-
ard points out that the precise hierarchy in which factors are placed may
dictate whether or not the transracial adoption is permitted. If, for exam-
ple, the principal goal is to find a stable and permanent family for the
child, the transracial adoption will be encouraged when no same-race
homes are available; if, however, cultural identity is weighed more heav-
ily, the transracial adoption will be discouraged.7' Twila Perry considers
the discretionary nature of the best interests standard to be a deficiency:
66. Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1204.
67. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105.01 (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 451-726;
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50517 (West 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.471 (Banks-Baldwin
1998); MICH. COMip. LAWS ANN. § 722.957(1) (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:30-40 (West
1998).
68. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, 16-18 (1985); Linda Henry
Elrod, Child Custody and Visitation, in FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE 32-1, 32-16 to 32-17
(Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 1992).
69. See generally Bartholet, supra note 5; Jo Beth Eubanks, Transracial Adoption in Texas:
Should the Best Interests Standard be Colorblind?, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1225 (1993); Howard, su-
pra note 39; Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of
Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990).
70. See Howard, supra note 38, at 503-04.
71. See id. at 519.
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Although the rule is intended to be a multi-factor balancing test, it may often
allow race inappropriately to achieve a dominant position. The rule affords a
level of discretion by courts and agencies that permits decisions to be made
on the basis of personal biases, unsupported assumptions, and incomplete
analyses that are often insensitive to the range of children's needs and that
ignore other important interests.
72
State statutes illustrate the discretionary nature of this essential prin-
ciple in child-placement proceedings. For example, the language of Con-
necticut's definition of the best interests standard indicates that its de-
lineation of the factors that 'shall' be included is illustrative rather than
exhaustive:
For the purpose of this section, 'best interests of the child' shall include, but
not be limited to, a consideration of the age of the child, the nature of the re-
lationship of the child with the caretaker of the child, the length of time the
child has been in the custody of the caretaker, the nature of the relationship
of the child with the birth parent, any relationship that may exist between the
child and siblings or other children in the caretaker's household, and the psy-
chological and medical needs of the child.... 
73
Another Connecticut statute prohibits the use of race as the sole deter-
mining factor in adoption placement decisions: "If the commissioner of
children and youth services is appointed as statutory parent for any child
free for adoption under 45a-725, said commissioner shall not refuse to
place such child with any prospective adoptive parent solely on the basis
of a difference in race." 74 Presumably, complete reliance on race would
not have to be explicitly prohibited were no one tempted to place so
much emphasis on race.
Case law endorses the best interests standard, and the federal courts
have repeatedly articulated that race may be a relevant, but not a deci-
sive, factor in child-placement proceedings.75 The "relevant-but-not-
decisive" or "relevant-but-not-conclusive" rule was established in In re
Adoption of a Minor, in which it was held that although race may be con-
sidered in the best interests determination, it may not be relied upon ex-
clusively: "There may be reasons why a difference in race, or religion,
may have relevance in adoption proceedings. But that factor alone can-
72. Perry, supra note 69, at 57.
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-719 (1995) (emphasis added).
74. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 451-726 (1995); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-727(c)(3) (1995)
("The court of probate shall not disapprove any adoption under this section solely because of an
adopting parent's marital status or because of a difference in race, color, or religion between a
prospective adopting parent and the child to be adopted....")
75. See In re Petition of R.M.G. and E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982) (stating that race
may be a relevant but not deciding factor); In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir.
1955) (stating that a difference in race may have relevance in an adoption proceeding but may
not be decisive in determining the child's welfare); Rockefeller v. Nickerson, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314
(1962) (stating that race may be a relevant but not decisive factor in adoption proceedings).
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not be decisive in determining the child's welfare.",7' The circuit court
overruled the district court's denial of a natural white mother and her
black husband's petition for adoption of a white child. The lower court
had focused on the difficult social problems the boy could face were he to
be adopted by a black man, including the loss of his status as a white
man. The appellate court found the trial court's reliance on racial consid-
erations to be impermissible because race was determinative of the
child's fate rather than merely one factor in the best-interest analysis.
The relevant-but-not-conclusive standard has received much of the
same criticism as the best interests standard: "With the present standard
it is all too easy for the courts to use race as the foundation for their deci-
sions and soothe constitutional injuries by disguising the decision behind
a sprinkling of other justifications that standing alone would not support
it."" Under the best interests standard, under which race can be a rele-
vant-but-not-decisive factor in a placement decision, courts can make bi-
ased decisions while nevertheless ostensibly adhering to the permissible
standard.
Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family & Children's
Services 7" exemplifies how courts can abuse the "relevant-but-not-
decisive" rule. Drummond involved a white couple's request to adopt a
mixed-race child who had been in its foster care for two years. Although
the Drummonds had received excellent reviews regarding their care of
the child, the placement agency decided to remove the child from their
home because it was concerned about a black child being raised in a
white home. The court rejected the Drummonds' complaint that their
equal protection rights had been violated.79 The Drummond court inter-
preted the current standard to mean that race can be decisive as long as a
placement decision is not automatically rejected on racial grounds:
But can race be taken into account, perhaps decisively if it is the factor which
tips the balance between two potential families, where it is not used auto-
matically? We conclude, as did another court which grappled with the prob-
lem, that the "difficulties inherent in interracial adoption" justify the consid-
eration of "race as a relevant factor in adoption .... ,so
Despite potential abuse of these rules, the United States Supreme
Court endorsed both the best interests standard and the "relevant-but-
not-decisive" rule in its only opinion on child placement, Palmore v. Si-
76. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d at 446,448 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
77. Angela McCormick, Transracial Adoption: A Critical View of the Court's Present Stan-
dards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303, 315 (proposing a "but for" analysis in the review of placement deci-
sions, under which the use of race would be unconstitutional if a different outcome would have
been reached "but for" the consideration of race).
78. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
79. See Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1204.
80. Id. at 1205.
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doti.s' Although family law is largely left to the individual states, the
Court granted certiorari to review a Florida state court child-custody de-
cision, because the case raised significant constitutional concerns about
race discrimination. The Florida court had awarded a change in custody
to the father on the grounds that the mother's cohabitation and subse-
quent marriage to a black man would expose the child to the social stig-
mas that can be faced by members of a mixed-race household." Parental
qualifications, devotion to the child, or adequacy of housing for either
party were not at issue in the case.
The Court reversed the custody change and held that it was unconsti-
tutional for the state to use race as the basis for removing a child from
the custody of its biological parent. Although the Supreme Court advo-
cated the use of the best interests standard, the Court took issue with
Florida's complete reliance on race in its custody decision:
The court correctly stated that the child's welfare was the controlling factor.
But that court was entirely candid and made no effort to place its holding on
any ground other than race. Taking the court's findings and rationale at face
value, it is clear that the outcome would have been different had petitioner
married a Caucasian male of similar respectability. 83
The Court criticized Florida's reasoning that there would be a damaging
impact on the child if she remained in a racially-mixed household and as-
serted that racial prejudice cannot be invoked to justify racial classifica-
tions: "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.'
'
4
The significance of this case with regard to transracial adoptions is
unclear, since the Court's decision has been narrowly interpreted to ap-
ply only to parental custody disputes. The decision may indicate that
some reasons for favoring same-race adoptions, such as avoidance of so-
cietal disapproval, are not to be considered when the best interestsof the
child is determined. Palmore alternatively can be taken to mean that race
cannot be the sole basis for removal of a child from custody. On this
reading, the decision does not necessarily apply to the initial placement
of children. The Court has made an analogous distinction in the employ-
ment discrimination context. The Court's jurisprudence in this area sug-
gests that consideration of race in the making of the decision to fire
someone is less acceptable than the consideration of race in the decision
to hire someone. Similarly, reliance on race in the decision to remove a
81. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
82. See id. at 430.
83. Id. at 432.
84. Id. at 433.
85. For a full discussion of this distinction, see infra Section III.D.
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child from a home in which he or she already has been placed may be
seen as worse than reliance on race in deciding whether to place a child
in a home. Palmore may also be seen as a restatement of the "relevant-
but-not-decisive" rule governing the adoption context, for race was not
precluded entirely from consideration in the custody decision.
C. Federal Legislation
The first significant statute governing the consideration of race in the
adoption context can be found in Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Title VI prohibits discrimination by federally funded adoption agencies:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."8 The federal policy guidelines of Title VI,
however, recognize an exception in the context of child placements:
Generally, under Title VI, race, color, or national origin may not be used as a
basis for providing benefits or services. However, in placing a child in an
adoptive or foster home it may be appropriate to consider race, color, or na-
tional origin as one of several factors .... This policy is based on unique as-
pects of the relationship between a child and his or her adoptive or foster
parents.
No explanation is offered as to what these "unique aspects" are that alter
Title VI's fundamental prohibition of racial discrimination.
More recent legislation has responded to the public outcry against
delays and denials in child placements caused by a bureaucratic over-
emphasis on race. Increasingly strict rules have been enacted to target the
obstacles to adoption and other child placements caused by the practice
of race-matching, each law an improvement on the previous one.
The Howard Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act was proposed
in 1993 to address this problem. The bill forbade the use of race, color, or
national origin to "unduly delay or deny placement." The inclusion of the
word "unduly" legitimized some delay in child placements due to the
consideration of race. Nowhere in the Act was the term "unduly delay"
defined, thus leaving the decision-makers with the liberty of deciding
what holding periods were permissible in child placements. In reaction to
the Metzenbaum bill, Harvard Law School professor Randall Kennedy
requested his colleague's support as he condemned the "undue delay"
standard as a congressional authorization for delays in child placements:
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994).
87. Memorandum from David Chavkin, Deputy Director for Program Dev., U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., to Virginia Apodaca, Region X Director, the Office for Civil Rights
(Jan. 19, 1981), quoted in Bartholet, supra note 5, at 1230.
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At present, there exists no congressional authorization for race matching,
much less for any delay in child placements for purposes of racial matching. If
this bill is enacted, there will exist congressional authorization for such delay.
Furthermore, the standard of undue delay is vague, a fact which will lodge
considerable power in the hands of social service bureaucrats whom review-
ing the courts will presume to have expertise... the undue delay standard
will add yet another barrier impeding those who wish to insure that all par-
entless children-including racial minority children-are given the opportu-
nity to be raised by loving adults as soon as humanly possible.,
Teachers of American Law Schools quickly sent Congress a letter stating
that the bill would actually discourage transracial placements by author-
izing delays in child placements for purposes of race-matching69 In strik-
ing the word "unduly" from the law, a 1994 proposal at least remedied
this criticism and eliminated congressional authorization for such delays.
The Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 (MEPA) 9° was a great im-
provement upon the Metzenbaum bill. The word "unduly" was not in-
cluded in the law, remedying the problem of the appearance of congres-
sional authorization of delays in child placement for purposes of finding
same-race families. The purpose of the law was "to promote the best in-
terests of children by-(1) decreasing the length of time that children
wait to be adopted; (2) preventing discrimination in the placement of
children on the basis of race, color, or national origin."91 Congress had
found that
(1) nearly 500,000 children are in foster care in the United States; (2) tens of
thousands of children in foster care are waiting for adoption; (3) 2 years and
8 months is the median length of time that children wait to be adopted; (4)
child welfare agencies should work to eliminate racial, ethnic, and national
origin discrimination and bias in adoption and foster care recruitment, selec-
tion, and placement procedures.92
MEPA prohibited adoption agencies receiving federal funds from
using race to delay or deny the adoption or foster care placement of a
child, and authorized the Department of Health and Human Services to
withhold federal funds from any agency not in compliance with the Act.
It provided, in relevant part:
(1) PROHIBITION. - An agency, or entity, that receives Federal assis-
tance and is involved in adoption or foster care placements may not-
88. Letter from Randall Kennedy, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Colleagues 9 (Nov. 3,
1993) (on file with The Yale Law & Policy Review).
89. See Letter from The Undersigned Teachers at American Law Schools to Congress (on
file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 5115(a) (1994).




(A) categorically deny to any person the opportunity to become an adop-
tive or a foster parent, solely on the basis of the race, color, or national origin
of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved; or
(B) delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster
care, or otherwise discriminate in making a placement decision, solely on the
basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or
the child, involved.
(2) PERMISSIBLE CONSIDERATION. - An agency or entity to
which paragraph (1) applies may consider the cultural, ethnic, or racial back-
ground of the child and the capacity of the prospective foster or adoptive
parents to meet the needs of a child of this background as one of a number of
factors used to determine the best interests of a child.
(3) DEFINITION. - As used in this subsection, the term 'placement de-
cision' means the decision to place, or to delay or deny the placement of, a
child in a foster care or an adoptive home, and includes the decision of the
agency or entity involved to seek the termination of birth parents rights or
otherwise make a child legally available for adoptive placement ....
Although MEPA was a step in the right direction, it has been criti-
cized as a mere restatement of the current federal law under Title V194
and for leaving with the Department of Health and Human Services the
power to prevent agencies from using race to delay adoption, a power
this department has not used in the past.5 More importantly, the Act did
nothing to change the excessive discretion inherent in the current stan-
dard and essentially repeated the "relevant-but-not-decisive" rule. One
commentator criticized the 1994 law as attempting a "legislative com-
promise between the friends and foes of adoptive race-matching."96
MEPA prohibited delays or denials in child placements solely due to
the race of the child or prospective parents. However, it listed racial and
ethnic considerations as permissible factors in the best interests determi-
nation. This feature of the Act permitted delays or denials due to racial
considerations as long as race was only one factor in the decision-making
process. MEPA has been attacked in principle and practice:
In its current form, however, the bill endorses the use of race as a factor in
such placement. This is wrong in principle, as it would put the federal gov-
ernment, for the first time in our history, in the position of endorsing race
separatism in the family. The [MEPA] also would be very problematic in
practice, since social workers hostile to transracial adoption are likely to mis-
use the discretion it would give them to consider race, in order to continue
current policies.
97
93. Id. § 553.
94. See Mini, supra note 28, at 967.
95. See id. at 961-62.
96. Cohen, supra note 52 at 653 n.2.
97. See Bartholet, supra note 16, at 104-05.
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MEPA also required that the Department of Health and Human
Services develop policy guidelines for child-placement agencies to fol-
low.9s In accordance with the MEPA, the guidelines provide that place-
ment agencies may consider the race and ethnicity of the child as well as
the capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to meet the child's needs
when making the placement determination. The guidelines recognize the
major role that social workers play in the making of adoption decisions.
The guidelines specifically provide that social workers in foster care and
adoption are in violation of MEPA when they (1) establish time periods
during which only a same-race or same-ethnicity search will occur; (2) es-
tablish orders of placement preferences based on race, culture, or ethnic-
ity; (3) specifically justify transracial placement; or (4) have the effect of
delaying placements to find a family of a particular race or ethnicity.99 A
social worker who writes a false or invalid assessment to impede a trans-
racial placement risks civil liability."'
The most recent legislation addressing the permissible role of race in
adoption and child-placement decision-making repealed the aforemen-
tioned section of MEPA. The Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of
1996 is an improvement on MEPA because it forbids any delay or denial
of child placement caused by decisions made "on the basis of race, color,
or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child in-
volved."'O' In contrast, MEPA forbade only those delays or denials of
placements made "solely" on the basis of race, color, or national origin,
indicating implicit approval of race-conscious practices leading to delays
in and denials of placements1 2 The 1996 Act further provides for reduc-
98. On April 25, 1995, the Department promulgated these guidelines, concluding that race,
color, or national origin is only permissible "when an adoption or foster care agency has made a
narrowly tailored, individualized determination that the facts and circumstances in a particular
case require the consideration of race, color, or national origin in order to advance the best in-
terests of the child in need of placement." Carla M. Curtis & Rudolph Alexander, The Multi-
ethnic Placement Act: Implications for Social Work Practice, 13 CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SOC.
WORK J. 401, 404 (1996) (quoting Department of Health and Human Services guidelines).
99. See id. at 407. Social workers are permitted to explore prospective families feelings
about parenting a child of a different race or ethnicity, as long as race is only one of many fac-
tors considered. Id. at 408.
100. See R. Alexander, Jr., Social Workers and Immunity from Civil Lawsuits, 40 Soc.
WORK 648, 648-54 (1995).
101. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808(c)(1)(A)-(B),
110 Stat. 1755, 1904. On May 10, 1996, the House approved the Adoption Promotion and Sta-
bility Act of 1996, H.R. 3286, 104th Cong. Both the Adoption Anti-Discrimination Act of 1996
and language from H.R. 3286 were attached to the Small Business and Minimum Wage Bill, as
reported in Conference Report No. 3448, and forwarded to President Clinton, who signed the
legislation on August 20, 1996. The ensuing act, Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption
amends § 471(a) and § 474 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§671(a), 674 and repeals § 553
of the MEPA, 42 U.S.C. §5115(a). See Howe, supra note 34, at 472.
102. It should be noted that neither the 1994 bill nor the 1996 law affect the application of
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, which attribute equal value to the best interests of both
the child and the tribe: "[lit is the policy of this Nation [the United States] to protect the best
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tion in funding to a state whose program is found to have violated 42
U.S.C. § 674(d),'O3 requires the return of all funds awarded to nonstate
entities within the state if such entity is found to have violated the sec-
tion, " and states that any such denial of placement is a violation of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.05 Moreover, the 1996 Act eliminated a
provision under which race was a "permissible consideration" in place-
ment decisions.' The 1996 law was intended both to defray adoption
costs and to promote the adoption of minority children.'O°
The law does not explicitly forbid the use of racial and ethnic consid-
erations in child placements. Nevertheless, the law does indicate that race
is an impermissible ground for denying the placement of a child for adop-
tion or into foster care. The Adoption Promotion and Stability Act is the
first congressional mandate to prohibit outright delays or denials in child
placements caused by race-matching policies. Like its predecessors, how-
ever, the 1996 law is subject to manipulation by adoption agencies and
social workers, who can easily circumvent the rule and untruthfully at-
tribute delays to permissible reasons. Although the language of the
MEPA is encouraging and gives the impression that the race-matching
dilemma is nearing an end, the social workers and adoption agencies
maintain enormous discretion under the new law. Elizabeth Bartholet
lists numerous reasons for concern about the continuation of race-
matching policies and resistance to the new law:
State social service agencies tend to be committed from top to bottom to
their race-matching ways. Private foundations and nonprofit child welfare
groups have joined forces with public agencies to promote 'kinship care,' in
part to help ensure that children in need of homes remain within their racial
group. 'Cultural competence' is one of the code phrases in the post-MEPA
era for assessing whether agencies remain sufficiently committed to same-
race matching and whether they are doing enough to recruit families of color
to make same-race placement possible. The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, responsible for enforcing MEPA, is peopled with child wel-
fare traditionalists imbued with the race-matching ideology. 10
The fact that the law can be manipulated merely indicates the inherent
difficulty of its enforcement and is not necessarily the consequence of
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and fami-
lies by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children .... 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
103. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 674(d)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
104. Id. § 674(d)(2).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996(b)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
106. See 42 U.S.C.A. 1996(b) (West Supp. 1998).
107. See 142 CONG. REC. 4775-77 (1996). The law provides that certain prospective parents
are eligible to receive a tax credit of up to five thousand dollars per child for adoption expenses.
108. Elizabeth Bartholet, supra note 18 at 2354.
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poor drafting. Yet it remains true that it is minority children who suffer
the negative effects of poor enforcement of the law.
III. THE FEDERAL SUBSIDY: A SOLUTION CONSISTENT WITH
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASE LAW
A. The Adoption Subsidy
Like the MEPA, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980 (Child Welfare Act) is a remedy for the disparate treatment of mi-
nority children who are in need of families. In existence since 1980, the
Child Welfare Act addresses the disproportionate numbers of minority
children in the foster care system. The legislative intent stated in the
adoption assistance section of the Act includes the provision of homes for
children who are hard to place. Prior to the enactment of the Child Wel-
fare Act, state child welfare service programs governed by Title IV(B) of
the Social Security Act were not closely monitored by the federal gov-
ernment.' °9 Under the old system, the federal government made a rela-
tively small federal contribution to the costs of state programs designed
to protect and promote the welfare of children, including measures taken
to place children in foster care, institutions and adoptive homes. Al-
though Title IV(B) authorized annual appropriations of up to $266 mil-
lion for child welfare services, the appropriation had never exceeded
$56.6 million, or 21% of the amount authorized.1 Additionally, most of
the expenditures reported by the states under this program were used to
provide foster care."'
The Child Welfare Act completely restructured the Social Security
Act programs for children by encouraging greater efforts to find perma-
nent homes for children, either by returning them to their own families,
or placing them in adoptive homes. Under the terms of the Act, the
amount of adoption assistance that the state will pay adoptive parents is
to be agreed upon by the state agency and the parents, but may not ex-
ceed the foster care maintenance payment that would be paid if the child
were in a foster family home. The amount may be readjusted by agree-
ment to reflect any changed circumstances. Such adoption assistance
payments will not be paid after the child reaches the age of eighteen or
109. See SENATE COMM. ON FiNANCE, ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE ACT
OF 1980, S. REP. NO. 96-336, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1460.
110. See id. at 1452-53, 1460.
111. See id. at 1461. According to HEW statistics, in 1979, about 3% of the total Federal,
State, and local funding under Title IV(B) was used for adoption services, 8% for day care, 73%
for foster care, 8% for protective services, and the remainder for a variety of other child welfare
services. See id. at 1461.
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for any period when the family income rises above the established lim-
its."
2
Under the Child Welfare Act, the federal matching rate is set at a flat
rate of seventy-five percent, and federal grants for child welfare services
that are set above the previous $56.5 million funding level cannot be used
for foster care maintenance payments. 3 The Act adds a new section to
Title IV(B) that specifically permits expenditures for state tracking and
information systems, designed to protect the rights of children, natural
114parents, and foster parents.
The subsidized adoption program provides federal matching funds
once a state has determined that a child in foster care would be eligible
for such funding or that a child has special needs that make the child dif-
ficult to place."" Each state is responsible for deciding which factors
would ordinarily impede the adoption of certain children. Once the state
determines that adoption assistance is needed, it may offer such assis-
tance to the prospective adoptive parents, provided that the family's in-
come does not exceed 125% of the median income of a family of four in
the state, adjusted to reflect the particular family's size."6 The Act is in-
tended to facilitate the elimination of barriers to adoption and to provide
permanent homes for children, particularly children who have unfavor-
able chances of placement because of a specific factor or condition. Thus
the program offers incentives to families to adopt children who may not
otherwise be adopted, and reduces government spending on costly foster
care systems that are not necessarily conducive to the child's well-
being.1 7
The federal adoption subsidy is an appropriate remedy for the dis-
crimination faced by black children in adoption placement. This Note fo-
cuses on the adoption assistance section of the statute,"' which addresses
the statistical imbalance of minority children in need of adoptive parents.
For affirmative action purposes, the crux of this section lies in the defini-
tion of a "special needs" child. The inclusion of ethnic background and
minority status among appropriately considered factors that make a child
extremely difficult to place makes this statute a race-based remedy, both
on its face and in application:
112. See id. at 1463.
113. See id. at 1452-53, 1462.
114. See id. at 1453, 1461.
115. See id. at 1450.
116. See id. at 1451, 1462.
117. See id. at 1462-63.
118. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 673 (1994).
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For purposes of this section, a child shall not be considered a child with spe-
cial needs unless- (1) the State has determined that the child cannot or
should not be returned to the home of his parents; and (2) the State has first
determined (A) that there exists with respect to the child a specific factor or
condition (such as his ethnic background, age, or membership in a minority or
sibling group, or the presence of factors such as medical conditions or physi-
cal, mental, or emotional handicaps) because of which it is reasonable to con-
clude that such child cannot be placed with adoptive parents without pro-
viding adoption assistance under this section ....
The inclusion of minority or ethnic status as a condition that discourages
adoption is disturbing for several reasons. First, this implies that to be
black is to bear a condition. Second, equating racial status with a handi-
cap or disability may be viewed as offensive and stigmatizing. Paying
adults to adopt black or other minority children may resemble bribery
and suggest that a child is less valuable. Finally, the premise underlying
the provision of a subsidy to parents adopting a child with special needs is
that greater financial costs are associated with raising such a child. How-
ever, this is not true in the case of a child who falls in the special needs
category simply because of his or her minority status.
Despite the apparent incongruity between race and other special
needs categories, the disproportionate number of minority children
waiting for parents results in waiting periods for these children that re-
semble those ensured by handicapped or ill children. The Act recognizes
the longer waiting periods that minority children face due in part to race-
matching practices and attempts to use the subsidy to remedy the harms
suffered by these practices. In addition, the fee practices of adoption
agencies and financial prerequisites established for adoption eligibility
serve as disincentives and barriers to lower income and minority families
wishing to adopt children °20 In recognition of this fact, the Act attempts
to remove some financial obstacles faced by black adults wishing to
adopt.
B. Affirmative Action and the Adoption Subsidy
The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 2' The federal
subsidy is color-blind in language but color-conscious in application. As a
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. See Howe, supra note 34, at 158.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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federal race-based program, the adoption subsidy is implicated in the
larger affirmative action controversy1 2 Governmental affirmative action
programs typically use racial classifications to assist members of minority
groups in achieving equal opportunity. Though affirmative action pro-
grams were created to counter the discriminatory and racist practices that
historically have impeded the advancement of members of minority
groups, opponents of these programs characterize racial preferences as
discriminatory policies that contradict the government policy of treating
all citizens equallyY3
In its 1995 decision of Adarand Constructors v. Pena,'24 the Supreme
Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal,
state, or local government, are "inherently suspect" and must survive
strict scrutiny review in order to be found constitutional'2 In doing so,
the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications
Commission'26 to the extent that it applied intermediate scrutiny to state
or local race-based classifications. The strict scrutiny standard applies re-
gardless of whether the classification has a seemingly benign or invidious
purpose."7 Under the two-prongs of strict scrutiny review, an affirmative
action program must serve a compelling governmental interest and be
narrowly tailored to meet the end sought.'2 Despite its adoption of this
higher standard of review for race-based classifications, the Adarand
Court reiterated the government's authority to take race-based affirma-
tive action when necessary to respond to the practice or lingering effects
of racial discrimination against minority groups. The Court emphasized
that racial classifications will not all fall when subjected to strict scrutiny
122. For a general discussion on affirmative action, see, for example, Morris B. Abram, Af-
firmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312 (1986); T. Alexan-
der Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991); Randall Ken-
nedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1327 (1986); Don Munro, The Continuing Evolution of Affirmative Action Under Title VII: New
Directions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81 VA. L. REv. 565(1995); Martin Schiff, Reverse
Discrimination Re-Defined as Equal Protection: The Orvellian Nightmare in the Enforcement of
Civil Rights Laws, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627 (1985); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Note, The
Affirmative Action Controversy, 3 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 111 (1985).
123. See David G. Savage, New Cases Return a Volatile Issue to the Top of the Supreme
Court's Agenda, 81 A.B.A.J. 40,41-42 (1995).
124. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
125. See id. at 227 (1995).
126. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (utilizing different equal protection standards for benign racial
classifications imposed by federal and state or local governments).
127. In this discussion, "benign" racial classification will refer to classifications imple-
mented to assist minorities, whether they have a remedial or non-remedial goal, that is, whether
or not they are intended to redress the effects of past discrimination. "Invidious" racial classifi-
cation, in contrast, will refer to racial classifications used to oppress a racial minority group.
128. See Adarand at 2117.
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review, stating that it wished "to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 1" 29
A great deal of affirmative action case law has developed addressing
the permissible governmental objectives in various contexts and outlining
the factors that should be considered in determining whether a program
is narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court, however, has never addressed
the benign use of racial classifications in the adoption context. Thus, it
remains unclear what constitutes a compelling governmental interest in
the adoption context. Though race-conscious relief is acceptable in lim-
ited terms, it is impossible to predict with certainty whether the federal
adoption subsidy would survive a constitutional challenge. The remain-
der of this Note explores the constitutionality of the adoption subsidy
program through analogies to case law on affirmative action in the scho-
lastic admission and employment contexts and concludes that the subsidy
would be upheld.
C. The Law on Graduate School Admissions
The use of benign race-based classifications in the context of graduate
school admissions led to the landmark affirmative action case Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.'3° Commentators have spoken of
Bakke as having "set the structure for all future discourse on affirmative
action"'13' and as having been the "genesis for the Court's current major-
ity position applying strict scrutiny to all race conscious affirmative action
programs.' 3 2 While it is difficult to distill from Bakke a definitive rule on
the use of race in school admissions, the Bakke decision indicates (1) that
race may be one of the many factors considered in the graduate school
admissions context and (2) that the use of a rigid quota or plan imposing
a fixed or reserved number of seats for minorities will probably not pass
constitutional muster.
In Bakke, a white male who twice had applied and been rejected by
the medical school at the University of California-Davis Medical School
challenged the medical school's admission program on constitutional and
statutory grounds. The program specifically reserved sixteen seats in each
entering class of 100 for disadvantaged minority students, and many ap-
plicants admitted under the special program had lower test scores than
did Bakke. Bakke alleged that the special admissions scheme violated the
129. Id.
130. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
131. Lucy Katz, Public Affirmative Action and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fragmenta-
tion of TheoryAfter Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 317,329 (1992).
132. David W. Case, Setting a Higher Standard: Judicial Review of Federal Affirmative Ac-
tion in the Wake of Adarand, 16 MIss. C. L. REv. 369,373 (1996).
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Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. There
was no majority opinion in Bakke, and six different opinions were writ-
ten. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun would have found
the medical school's affirmative action policy constitutional.' Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist believed the
program violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
racial discrimination by federally funded institutions"' Because the
Court was so divided, Justice Powell's intermediate opinion acquired par-
ticular significance. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell wrote that the
goal of having a diverse student body was a constitutionally permissible
objective for an institution of higher education but that the means used
by the school were not narrowly tailored to attaining the goal of a het-
erogeneous student body. Wary of strict quota or set-aside policies under
which a certain number of places are reserved for minorities, Powell ad-
vocated the use of a more flexible program under which ethnic diversity
was to be one factor considered in the decision (a "plus" factor). 131
Though Bakke indicates that quotas are impermissible, the "plus" ap-
proach continues to be used by many graduate schools.
In both the adoption and scholastic contexts, minorities can suffer ra-
cial discrimination at the hands of state actors. Like adoption agencies,
social workers, and other child-placement decision-makers, members of
university admission committees have great discretionary powers and are
able to weigh race in their decisions. Discrimination can be masked. Non-
racial considerations can be advanced to justify the decision to deny both
a transracial adoption and the scholastic admission of a minority. The
parallel between the two situations, however, is complicated by the pres-
ence of additional victims in the adoption context-the prospective
adopting parents. When a minority applicant is rejected by a school on
the basis of her race, it is the applicant who suffers the effects of the ra-
cial discrimination. In contrast, when a minority child is denied a transra-
cial placement on the basis of her race, both the child and her prospective
parents suffer the effects of the racial discrimination. Although the fed-
eral subsidy follows the child rather than the parents, it should be noted
that more parties are directly affected by racial discrimination in the
adoption context.
Since Bakke, the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of af-
firmative action in the context of graduate school admissions, despite
133. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part).
134. See id. at 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
135. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307,316-17.
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having had the opportunity to do so. Very recently, the Supreme Court
denied writ of certiorari to hear a highly publicized case that squarely
confronted affirmative action in the context of graduate school admis-
sions, challenged the significance of Bakke, and made it more difficult for
affirmative action plans to stand.'37 In Hopwood v. Texas,'3 one white
female and three white males brought an action claiming that their right
to equal protection under the law had been violated by the University of
Texas's admission policies, which were functionally equivalent to a quota
system. The law school's procedure entailed separate admissions commit-
tees for evaluation of minority and nonminority applicants and ensured
that each class would be five percent black and ten percent Mexican-
American. These numbers were not randomly selected but corresponded
to the percentages of minority college graduates in Texas. The presump-
tive-denial criteria for the two groups differed, and minority applicants
who fell below the presumptive-denial criteria were not summarily de-
nied admission but placed in the discretionary zone. "'
Although the district court had found that diversity was a compelling
governmental interest, it had also found that the law school's admissions
policies were not narrowly tailored, primarily because of the burden they
placed on third parties. The district court named four factors to be con-
sidered in the narrow tailoring analysis: (1) the possibility of alternate
remedies, (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief, (3) whether the
goals related to the percentage of minorities in the population, and (4)
the adverse effects on third parties.140 The trial court concluded that the
law school's policy failed the fourth factor, because under the separate
admissions procedures minority students were admitted without being
136. In fact, the Supreme Court appeared hesitant to address the issue in the first place, for
in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), decided before Bakke, the Court rejected an op-
portunity to decide on the propriety of using race as a factor in graduate school admissions. De-
Funis, a nonminority applicant, brought a suit against University of Washington Law School, a
state-operated school, claiming that its admissions policy discriminated against him in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Minority and nonminority ap-
plications were evaluated differently under the law school's admission procedures, and all but
one of the minority applicants had lower index scores than that of DeFunis in the year he was
rejected. The Supreme Court found the case moot, because injunctive relief had already been
granted to DeFunis, and declined to address the affirmative action issue, stating that considera-
tion of the constitutional issues was beyond its jurisdictional power under Article III. See id.
137. See Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
138. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
139. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 575 (W.D. Tex. 1994). The law school had
established a system under which students who met certain criteria were very likely to be admit-
ted to the school, students who fell below certain criteria were likely to be denied admission,
and the remaining students were placed in a discretionary zone. See id. at 935.
140. See id. at 573.
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compared to nonminority applicants. It was held that nonminorities
were affected adversely by this system. 142
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit also invalidated the admissions policies
used at the University of Texas Law School under strict-scrutiny analysis,
but used a drastically different rationale.143 The court held that diversity
in a university student body can never be a compelling reason to impose
racial classifications and that race cannot be used as a factor at all in ad-
missions, not even as a "plus" factor as advocated by Justice Powell in
Bakke: "[W]e see the case law as sufficiently established that the use of
ethnic diversity simply to achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part of the
consideration of a number of factors, is unconstitutional."
' 44
The court chose to rely on Adarand, indicating that it did not see its
decision as contradicting Bakke, because only Justice Powell had found
diversity to be a compelling governmental objective and because his view
never has been supported by a majority of the Supreme Court justices.
The court relied on Justice O'Connor's dissent in Adarand to support its
view that remediation of the present effects of past discrimination was
the only objective that would survive strict scrutiny review:
Modem equal protection has recognized only one [compelling state] interest;
remedying the effects of racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the
diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It is
simply too amorphous, too insubstantial and too unrelated to any legitimate.. . . . 145
basis for employing racial classification.
The Hopwood court similarly dismissed the finding in Metro Broadcast-
ing that diversity can be a compelling governmental interest.
46
As a factual matter, the Hopwood court rejected the claim that the
University of Texas's policies had a remedial purpose, because there was
no evidence that the law school itself had discriminated or that the poli-
cies addressed the present effects of past discrimination.47 Finally, the
Hopwood court altered the burden of proof as to causation, directing the
lower court to shift the burden to the defendant law school to show by a
141. See id. at 575.
142. See id. at 578.
143. See Hopwood, 78 F. 3d. at 943.
144. Id. at 945.
145. Id. at 945.
146. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). The Metro Broadcasting Court found
that safeguarding the public's right to receive a diversity of views and information over the air-
ways was an integral component of the FCC's mission, served important First Amendment val-
ues, and was, at the very least, an important governmental objective. Though Adarand over-
ruled Metro Broadcasting to the extent that it relied on intermediate scrutiny, Adarand does not
limit benign racial classifications to remedial purposes. Currently, it is unclear whether diver-
sity is a permissible governmental objective.
147. See Hopwood, 78 F. 3d at 953-54.
Yale Law & Policy Review
preponderance of evidence that the plaintiffs would not have been admit-
ted under proper admissions policies.' 4
The Hopwood decision altered the law on affirmative action in crucial
ways, eliciting immediate response from academics.'49 Though binding
only on public schools within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit, this de-
cision reflects a conservative shift in Americans' attitudes toward the use
of benign racial classifications and, at a minimum, jeopardizes the diver-
sity objective as a compelling governmental interest in higher education,
if not in all contexts. Pursuant to Hopwood, Texas, Louisiana, and Mis-
sissippi public universities are barred from using race as a factor in their
admissions policies. These states have already suffered sharp declines in
the numbers of minority applicants, declines that are attributable, at least
in part, to the Hopwood decision.' 50 Hopwood's significance is far-
reaching; its force is not confined to the admissions context but could be
extended to any and all contexts where affirmative action programs exist.
Though he concurred in the judgment, Judge Weiner noted that the
majority's reasoning may have reached a result more harsh than that de-
manded by Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence:
My decision not to embrace the ratio decidendi of the majority opinion re-
sults from three premises: First, if Bakke is to be declared dead, the Supreme
Court, not a three-judge panel of a circuit court, should make that an-
nouncement. Second, Justice O'Connor expressly states that Adarand is not
the death knell of affirmative action-to which I would add, especially not in
the framework of achieving diversity in public graduate schools. Third, we
have no need to decide the thornier issue of compelling interest, as the nar-
rowly tailored inquiry of strict scrutiny presents a more surgical and-it
seems to me- more principled way to decide the case before us. 5
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari is somewhat surprising because
it would seem that the Court would want to correct the Fifth Circuit's
prohibition on the use of benign racial classifications by public universi-
ties. In declining to hear the case, however, Justices Souter and Ginsburg
stated that the University of Texas Law School's admissions policies were
148. The district court had placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to show that they
would have been admitted absent the constitutional violation. In changing the burden of proof,
the Fifth Circuit relied on a 1977 Supreme Court case, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
149. See, e.g., Erin Albritton, Hopwood v. Texas: Affirmative Action Encounters a Formi-
dable and Fatal Match in the Fifth Circuit, 71 TUL. L. RFV. 303 (1996); Note, Hopwood v.
Texas: The Fifth Circuit Further Limits Affirmative Action Educational Opportunities, 56 MD. L.
REV. 273 (1997); Case Comment, Fifth Circuit Holds that Educational Diversity Is No Longer a
Compelling State Interest-Hopwood v. Texas, 110 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1997).
150. As of February of 1997, the University of Texas law school experienced a 40% drop in
the number of African-American applicants and a 20% drop in the number of Latino applicants
as compared to 1996. See Minority Applications Drop at Texas Schools, NAT'L JURIST,
May/June 1997, at 11.
151. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 963-64 (Weiner, J., concurring in the judgment).
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no longer in controversy and that the Court wanted to wait for a final
judgment on a program genuinely in controversy before addressing the
affirmative action issue.152
Similarly, in 1995 the Court denied certiorari in a case involving the
use of affirmative action in the awarding of scholarships in higher educa-
tion."3 In Podberesky v. Kirwan, the Fourth Circuit held that the Univer-
sity of Maryland's scholarship program was unconstitutional because it
limited eligibility for one of its scholarships to black students. Maryland
maintains two scholarship programs. The Banneker Scholarship program
was a merit-based program for which only black students were eligible;
the Francis Scott Key program was open to all students but had more
stringent requirements. Podberesky, a Latino student, was unable to
meet the rigorous standards of the Key program and was precluded from
applying for the Banneker scholarship on the basis of his race.
The Fourth Circuit struck down the scholarship program as unconsti-
tutional due to insufficient evidence of the present effects of past dis-
crimination at the university. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, the Su-
preme Court had required a finding of past discrimination to justify the
application of race-based remedy.'-" The Podberesky Court found that
the program was not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past dis-
crimination that had resulted in low graduation rates for African-
Americans, the school's negative reputation in the African-American
community, the under-representation of African-American students in
the student body, and the hostile environment African-American stu-
dents allegedly faced. Like the Hopwood court, the Fourth Circuit re-
quired that affirmative action policies address the present effects of past
discrimination.
D. The Law on Employment Policies in Hiring, Firing, and Promotions
Recent employment discrimination jurisprudence indicates that race-
based affirmative action measures that burden innocent parties in order
to benefit another group will be found unconstitutional. In particular,
courts have found that the loss of an existing job imposes too large a bur-
den on innocent parties and have tended to overturn such schemes. The
federal adoption subsidy benefits black children without taking away
benefits from another group, a fact that should be viewed favorably by a
152. Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
153. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 2001
(1995).
154. See 488 U.S. 469,493,499,510-11.
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court determining whether an affirmative action measure is narrowly
tailored to achieve its stated objective.
Generally, constitutional questions pertaining to affirmative action
programs arise when race-conscious hiring, firing, and promotions poli-
cies are adopted voluntarily by a public employer or as a court-ordered
response to remedy past discrimination. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education,' the Supreme Court overturned an affirmative action scheme
affording black teachers greater protection from layoffs than white
teachers. The provision at issue was part of a collective-bargaining
agreement between the Board of Education and a teachers' union. The
agreement provided that, if layoffs became necessary, teachers with the
most seniority would be retained as long as the percentage of minority
personnel laid off never exceeded the percentage of minority personnel
employed at the time of the layoff. Subsequently, layoffs became neces-
sary and some nonminority teachers were laid off despite having more
seniority than some of the minority teachers who were retained. The
nonminority teachers brought suit alleging violation of the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In striking down the race-based layoff provision under strict scrutiny
analysis, the Court concluded that the program was not narrowly tailored
and rejected the two objectives advanced by the Board: the provision of
minority role models for the school's minority students and the redress of
past discrimination. The former goal was rejected on the grounds that it
had no logical end and that it did not necessarily bear a relationship to
the harm caused by prior discriminatory practices. The Court analogized
the role model theory to societal discrimination:
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing
a racially classified remedy. The role model theory announced by the District
Court and the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness. There are numer-
ous explanations for a disparity between the percentage of minority students
and the percentage of minoritV faculty, many of them completely unrelated
to discrimination of any kind.
Instead, the Court required that there be strong evidence of prior dis-
crimination by the governmental unit involved, evidence that it had not
found in the case at hand, to justify even the limited use of racial classifi-
cations to remedy past discrimination.
The Court stated that even if the goal of providing minority role
models were found to be compelling, the means employed were not nar-
rowly tailored and could not survive strict scrutiny. While recognizing
that innocent people are sometimes called upon to bear some of the bur-
155. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
156. Id. at 276.
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den caused by plans intended to remedy the effects of racial discrimina-
tion, the Court emphasized that the burden actually shouldered by non-
minorities must be relatively light or at least diffused throughout society.
Nevertheless, the Court distinguished the burden imposed on innocent
employment applicants by hiring schemes:
Denial of future employment is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job....
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of
several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial
equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of
their lives. That burden is too intrusive.
157
The Court felt that less intrusive means of accomplishing similar pur-
poses, such as the implementation of hiring goals, were available. The
plan's adverse effect on non-minorities was clearly the critical factor in
the court's decision to strike down the layoff scheme.
The distinction articulated between hiring and firing is significant in
terms of the adoption subsidy. In Wygant, the Court objected to the
challenged plan because whites were more likely than blacks to have to
shoulder a particularly intrusive burden, job loss. The fact that the adop-
tion subsidy benefits minorities without burdening non-minorities would
be viewed positively under the narrow-tailoring analysis, since no class is
disadvantaged by the awarding of the subsidy.
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission," decided the same year as Wy-
gant, is further proof of the theory that it is easier for a race-based classi-
fication to pass strict scrutiny if, while benefiting one party, it does not
overly burden another. In Local 28, the Court upheld a court-ordered
hiring goal that established a goal of 29.23% minority membership in a
union that had repeatedly discriminated against minorities in the past.
The selected percentage was not random, but was based on the percent-
age of minorities in the relevant labor pool in New York City. In addi-
tion, the Court also upheld the requirement that a special fund be created
for use to implement measures intended to increase minority member-
ship in the union.
In 1975 the district court had found that the petitioner union had
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating
against minorities in the areas of recruitment, selection, training, and ad-
vancement. The State Commission found that Local 28 had never had
any black members or apprentices and that admission was conducted on
a nepotistic basis in that new members had to be sponsored by current
157. Id. at 283.
158. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
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union members. Since the composition of the union was strictly white,
this admission policy created an impenetrable barrier for minorities.159
The district court ordered the union to establish a 29% minority
membership goal by 1981, based on its finding that the union had dis-
criminated against qualified minorities through a variety of practices.' 60
The court of appeals twice upheld both the special fund intended to in-
crease minority membership and the affirmative action program, the lat-
ter of which was amended to establish a 29.23% nonwhite membership
goal by September of 1987. After the initial order was entered, the union
repeatedly was found guilty of having disobeyed the court's orders and
fined. The court found the union guilty of egregious noncompliance with
its orders and of determined resistance to all efforts to integrate its mem-
161bership. The union appealed, claiming that the membership goal and
special fund were unconstitutional, that the district court had used incor-
rect statistics in evaluating the practices, and that race-conscious reme-
dies could not be extended to individuals who had not been the direct
victims of unlawful discrimination.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, stating that
the hiring goal was narrowly tailored to further the Government's com-
pelling interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination. The Court
found that the hiring goal and special fund were necessary to remedy the
lack of minority membership caused by the union's pervasive and egre-
gious discrimination, especially given the union's poor track record of
compliance with court-ordered remedies. The Court concluded that the
hiring goal was narrowly tailored to further the remedial objective on the
basis of four factors: its flexible application, temporary nature, marginal
impact on nonminorities, and the union's repeated refusals to comply
with past court orders.' 62
The district court had adjusted the deadline for meeting the member-
ship goal twice in the past and had repeatedly accepted the union's ex-
planations for its failure to meet membership targets. The Court viewed
159. See id. at 427.
160. The court found that the union had adopted admissions criteria unrelated to job per-
formance, resulting in an adverse discriminatory impact on minorities. Such practices included
restricting the size of union membership in order to deny access to minorities, organizing unions
selectively in industries with mostly white union workers, accepting only white transfer appli-
cants from sister locals until the litigation began, and telling nonwhite members from sister lo-
cals that they were not eligible for transfer. See id. at 429-431.
161. See id. at 438.
162. In his concurrence, Justice Powell lists the five factors distilled from previous cases
that should be applied when considering the proper scope of race-conscious programs: (1) the
efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) the planned duration of the remedy; (3) the relationship
between the percentage of minority workers in the union and the percentage of minority work-
ers in the relevant population; (4) the availability of waiver provisions in the plan; and (5) the
effect of the plan on innocent third parties. See id. at 486.
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the program favorably because it was a means to ensure compliance with
court orders rather than a strict racial quota unlinked to the union's past
actions. Also significant to the Court's finding was the fact that the mem-
bership goal and special fund were temporary measures that would end
as soon as the union's membership reflected the percentage of minorities
in the relevant local labor force. The burden on nonminorities was
deemed slight because, unlike the policy at issue in Wygant, this program
did not result in the loss of jobs or the experiencing of adverse effects by
union members. The Court also stated that the benefits of race-conscious
remedies need not be received solely by the victims of past discrimina-
tion. 3
In United States v. Paradise,'6' the Court upheld a rigid promotion
program, similar to a quota system, that had been developed as a reme-
dial measure based on past discrimination. The district court had found
that the Alabama Department of Public Safety (the Department) sys-
tematically had excluded blacks from employment as state troopers until
1972. The district court consequently had issued a hiring quota and had
ordered that the Department utilize nondiscriminatory practices in such
areas as promotions. When no blacks were promoted to upper rank po-
sitions by 1979, a consent decree was approved in which the Department
would develop a promotion procedure that did not adversely affect
blacks.' 6 When no black troopers had been promoted by 1981, a second
consent decree was approved in which the Department agreed to admin-
ister a promotion test that would not adversely affect blacks. 6' Upon
finding that this test had an adverse impact on blacks, the district court in
1983 again ordered the Department to submit a plan that did not ad-
versely affect blacks and that would result in the promotion of fifteen
qualified candidates to the position of corporal.'6'
When the Department proposed that four of the fifteen promotions
be awarded to blacks, the district court rejected the proposal. The court
ordered instead that at least fifty percent of those promoted to corporal
and other high ranks be black so long as there were qualified blacks
available for promotion.6 9 This order was to be applicable if less than
twenty-five percent of persons holding a particular rank were black until
the Department developed a promotion plan that did not adversely affect
blacks. The United States appealed on the grounds that the promotion
163. See id. at 422.
164. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
165. See id. at 153.
166. See id. at 157.
167. See id. at 159.
168. See id. at 162.
169. See id. at 162-163.
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scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. ° The
Supreme Court held that the one-for-one promotion scheme survived
strict scrutiny.7 As in Local 28, the Court found that the state had a
compelling governmental interest in remedying the racial imbalance
caused by Alabama's past discriminatory practices.
The Court also concluded that the program was narrowly tailored de-
spite its strict numerical promotion requirement:
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to
several factors, including the necessity of the relief and the efficacy of alter-
native remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief; the availability of
waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant la-
bor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties. When
considered in light of those factors, it was amply established, and we find that
the one-for-one promotion requirement was narrowly tailored to serve its
several purposes, both as applied to the initial set of promotions to the rank
of corporal and as a continuing contingent order with respect to the upper
ranks. 
72
The Court found the plan necessary to eliminate the effects of the De-
partment's long-term, pervasive discrimination. The plan was considered
to be flexible because it made exceptions for external forces, could be
waived if there were no available qualified black candidates, and only
applied when the department needed to make promotions. Also viewed
favorably was the fact that the plan was temporary and lasted only until
the Department developed a promotion procedure that had no dispro-
portionately negative impact on blacks.'73 Likewise found appropriate
was the numerical relief ordered, that one black candidate had to be
promoted for every white candidate promoted, until twenty-five percent
of the officers of that rank were black, mirroring the percentage of mi-
norities in the relevant labor pool.
The burden on third parties was found to be slight, since the plan only
postponed the promotions of qualified whites. The Court likened the
burden imposed by the promotion preference to the burden imposed by
hiring goals, noting that the temporary fifty percent promotion require-
ment would not cause white employees to be discharged, as would layoff
preferences: "Consequently, like a hiring goal, it [imposes] a diffuse bur-
den, . ., foreclosing only one of several opportunities."' 74 In upholding a
strict numerical promotion scheme, the Court implied that it will view the
burden caused by race-based promotion preferences to be less than those
170. See id. at 153.
171. See id. at 167.
172. Id. at 171 (1987) (citations omitted).
173. See id. at 178.
174. Id. at 183 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283).
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caused by hiring goals and will view hiring goals and promotion prefer-
ences as far less devastating on third parties than layoff schemes.
The Supreme Court appears more willing to find race-conscious
measures constitutional when they are utilized in the employment con-
text than in other contexts. This fact may explain why a numerical solu-
tion may be denied in one arena and accepted in another. The long his-
tory of discrimination and refusal to obey consent decrees apparent in
the cases discussed above should not be minimized. Local 28, for exam-
ple, arguably shows as much about the Court's willingness to assert its
authority in order to enforce its own decrees as it does about acceptable
affirmative action schemes.
To be sure, Paradise and Local 28 highlight the principle that reme-
dial programs will be found to be directed toward a compelling govern-
mental interest if there is a finding that the entity enforcing the race-
conscious measure discriminated in the past. These cases also identify
factors to be considered in the narrow tailoring analysis in the employ-
ment context, many of which overlap with those named in other affirma-
tive action contexts. The employment discrimination cases also indicate
that rigid numerical schemes very similar to quotas may pass the narrow
tailoring test. Finally, Paradise and Local 28 announce a distinction never
before articulated regarding the burdens caused by employment hiring
and firing. Viewed together, these cases indicate that there is a need for
and a commitment to race-based policies and reject the idea that only
very narrow race-based policies can be implemented. They further sug-
gest that the implementation of affirmative action programs is permissi-
ble and that the propriety of their use is to be determined on a case-by-
case basis.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to a Seventh Circuit
case that addressed the constitutionality of promotion preferences 17' and
reached the opposite conclusion from that of the Fifth Circuit in Hop-
wood. In contrast to the Hopwood court, the court in Wittmer v. Peters76
underscored the need for race-based measures and rejected the sugges-
tion that racial classifications can be used only for remedial purposes. In
Wittmer, the Seventh Circuit held that the giving of preference to a black
male applicant for the position of lieutenant at a county boot camp be-
cause of his race did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
After applying unsuccessfully for the position of lieutenant, white
correctional officers brought suit because they had scored higher on the
test administered to applicants than the black correctional officer who
175. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 949 (1997).
176. 87 F.3d. 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
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was chosen for promotion.'"7 The Seventh Circuit found that the promo-
tion survived strict scrutiny, because the promotion of black officers was
considered to be a penological necessity in the particular prison involved.
The prison administration's major strategy for inmate reform was the
meting out of harsh treatment of inmates by drill sergeant-like correc-
tional officers in order to break the inmate's spirit and remold his charac-
ter. 17' A black lieutenant was considered necessary for the job because
black inmates were believed to be unlikely to submit to brutality adminis-
tered exclusively by whites. Prison administration experts indicated that
the boot camp would not succeed in its mission to reform inmates unless
a black male was appointed to one of the lieutenant slots. The staff was
considered too white to achieve this mission, because though almost sev-
enty percent of the prison's inmates were black, its security staff was less
than six percent black.
179
The court directly addressed the existence of interests other than that
of remedying the effects of past discrimination that are compelling
enough to justify the use of racial classifications. Judge Posner firmly re-
jected the assertion that the redress of the present effects of past dis-
crimination is the only permissible objective under strict scrutiny, stating
that statements by courts proffered to support this proposition were dicta
rather than holdings and thus not authoritative.1" The court concluded
that nonremedial interests may warrant a discriminatory measure: "[O]ur
point is that the rectification of past discrimination is not the only setting
in which government officials can lawfully take race into account in
making decisions." '181 In a manner consistent with much of the employ-
ment discrimination case law, Wittmer maintains that the legitimacy of
affirmative action is context- and situation-specific:
A judge would be unreasonable to conclude that no other consideration ex-
cept a history of discrimination could ever warrant a discriminatory measure
unless every other consideration had been presented to and rejected by him..
. It is not as if the rectification of past discrimination had a logical or e~uita-
ble priority over other legitimate goals that 
discrimination might serve.
177. The three white men had ranked third, sixth, and eighth on the test, whereas the black
man had ranked forty-second. See id. at 917.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 920. Interestingly, though the Court accepted the argument that black lieu-
tenants were needed to avoid the appearance of white domination of black inmates, it rejected,
as it had in Wygant, the argument that black correctional officers were needed as positive role
models. See id. It should be noted that one reason advanced for preferring the same-race
placement of black children is that they will be provided with black role models. The role-model
theory may be rejected by the Court in the adoption context as well.





Wittmer is a significant case for several reasons. In effect, the Wittmer
decision restores meaning to the term "benign discrimination." By hold-
ing that the redress of past discrimination is not the only legitimate pur-
pose for a race-based classification and by accepting a compelling gov-
ernmental interest never before recognized, Wittmer lends hope that
strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." This novel deci-
sion creates many possibilities for the recognition of other legitimate jus-
tifications for the use of race-conscious measures. In light of Wittmer, the
fact that the federal adoption subsidy may serve a nonremedial objective
never before recognized would not make the subsidy automatically un-
constitutional. The precedential value of Wittmer in a nonprison context
is debatable, however, given that courts often are deferential where
prison administration is concerned. It is not clear that the Supreme Court
would adopt the Wittmer court's rationale in a different context. Al-
though the Wittmer decision is binding on only the states within the Sev-
enth Circuit and may be distinguishable on its facts from other cases, it
provides a counterexample to the Hopwood court's strict reading of the
single permissible governmental objective justifying the implementation
of race-conscious remedies.
IV. THE FEDERAL ADOPTION SUBSIDY UNDER HoPwoOD OR
WITTMER
There is currently a split between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits over
the use of racial classifications for nonremedial purposes. A tension exists
between the Hopwood and Wittmer decisions regarding the permissible
use of race-conscious remedies. This Part argues that the federal adop-
tion subsidy would survive strict scrutiny under either Hopwood or
Wittmer and thus would be constitutional regardless of which decision the
Supreme Court upholds.
Despite the semblance of order in affirmative action jurisprudence,
the permissibility of a race-based classification varies depending on area
in which the classification is being used. As one judge recently put it, the
cases leave the definition of what constitutes a compelling governmental
interest "suspended somewhere in the interstices of constitutional inter-
pretation.' 3 What is clear is that a race-based classification must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest in order to be
found constitutional. The constitutionality of the federal adoption sub-
sidy is ripe for exploration, given that the continued existence of affirma-
183. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d. 932, 964 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., concurring).
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tive action programs is in jeopardy after the passage of the California
Civil Rights Initiative T8 and the rendering of the Hopwood decision.
The Hopwood opinion altered the political and legal landscape of af-
firmative action jurisprudence, throwing into question the continued vi-
ability of the Bakke decision. After Hopwood, the constitutionality of a
race-based classification that is narrowly tailored to further the goal of
diversity is ambiguous at best. In effect, Hopwood seeks to eradicate the
concept of benign discrimination by equating the term with traditional
discrimination against minorities and to bar race-conscious remedies ex-
cept when they are implemented to address the present effects of past
discrimination.
The federal adoption subsidy can be found constitutional whether the
Supreme Court embraces the holding and reasoning of Hopwood or that
of Wittmer"5 The Court, of course, is not bound to follow either stan-
dard, but the subsidy is likely to be upheld under any of several stan-
dards. Under Hopwood, the redress of past discrimination is the only le-
gitimate purpose justifying a race-conscious measure. Therefore, it is
necessary to determine whether the goal of the federal adoption subsidy
is indeed a permissible governmental objective serving a remedial pur-
pose. At first glance, it would seem that the goal of finding permanent
homes for hard-to-place children would fail under Hopwood's strict defi-
nition of a compelling governmental interest. Evidence of past discrimi-
nation by states, however, should establish the need for the adoption sub-
sidy as a remedial measure. For instance, a finding that most states
maintain or only recently have repealed discriminatory policies-for ex-
ample, policies that preclude transracial adoption until either a certain
time period has expired or the exhaustion of efforts to make same-race
placements is documented-may be compelling enough to justify the use
of the race-conscious federal adoption subsidy.
A state's repeal of holding statutes or policies would not necessarily
indicate the absence of state discrimination. Indeed, a court might view
the fact that federal legislation was deemed necessary to supersede the
numerous state statutes allowing or mandating delays or denials of trans-
racial placements as indicating the gravity and magnitude of state-
sponsored racial discrimination in child placement. In itself, this fact may
provide sufficient evidence to justify the use of a racial classification to
184. After the California Civil Rights Initiative, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 209 (West), outlawed
race-based preferences at the state-operated universities in California, Boalt Hall School of
Law's minority enrollment experienced an enormous drop: fall enrollment plummeted from 28
Latino and 20 black students in 1996 to a mere 14 Latino students and one black student in
1997. See Annie Nakao, UC Law School Task Force Tells Boalt To Woo Minorities; Urges Better
Outreach, Changes in Educating Applicants, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 17, 1997, at Al.
185. For the purpose of this discussion, it should be assumed that the holdings of Hopwood
and Wittmer are taken to extend to the adoption context.
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remedy the present effects of past discrimination. Of course, under the
stringent Hopwood standard, only states within which holding statutes
had been enforced and that offered evidence of their past discrimination
would be able to offer the subsidy.
Holding statutes would not be the only form of state action that could
justify race-conscious remedial measures. In the adoption context, the
conduct and personal biases of adoption agencies, social workers, and
bureaucrats toward transracial placements have contributed to the dis-
proportionate numbers of minority children needing homes. Though Wy-
gant and Wittmer demonstrate that general societal discrimination is not a
sufficient justification for the use of a race-based remedial measure, the
specific discrimination perpetuated by adoption agencies, social workers,
and bureaucrats is not the kind of vague societal discrimination described
in these cases. Courts tend to reject the "general societal discrimination"
rationale for race-based classifications it has no logical ending point and
is difficult to measure and monitor. Unlike general societal discrimina-
tion, the conduct of adoption agencies can be identified more precisely
and has a more direct impact on children awaiting adoption.
The goals of placement of black children in permanent homes and of
the redress of past discrimination by state actors cannot be separated,
given the intimate connection between the state's past practices and the
disproportionately long waiting periods faced by black children seeking
to be adopted. s6 Examination of the roles of two categories of actors con-
tributing to the placement problem makes this point clear. The first cate-
gory consists of bureaucrats working for state agencies. These state actors
have the power to prevent transracial adoptions, whether they do so
based on personal bias or adherence to state-imposed regulations. Such
bureaucrats are analogous to employers who do not want to hire or pro-
mote black employees. The harm caused by their conduct is more specific
than "general societal discrimination."
The members of the second relevant category of actors7Y private
adoption agencies and social workers receiving federal money, also di-
rectly impact the lives of children awaiting adoption. These actors have
great discretion and can consider race in the best interests determination
and in controlling placement outcomes. Furthermore, they are licensed
by the state and act under state supervision. In addition, they perform a
traditional state function, the placement of children in need of homes.
Accordingly, these workers are state actors. Given racially discriminatory
186. See discussion supra Part I.
187. Members of a third category of actors, persons wanting to adopt, are not state actors
because their decision whether or not to adopt a black child is a private choice that is not linked
to or sponsored by the government.
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state action, whether committed by public or private adoption agencies,
the goals of remedying the effects of past discrimination and finding
homes for hard-to-place children are not independent but rather closely
connected goals in the adoption forum.
In determining the legitimacy of the proffered goal, the Court also
may examine the subsidy's legislative history to determine the reason for
the passage of the Child Welfare Act. The adoption assistance section of
the Child Welfare Act identifies its purpose as the elimination of barriers
to transracial adoption and providing homes for children who are hard to
place.' This fact supports the conclusion that the subsidy is intended to
be a remedy for past racial discrimination by state actors. Courts may
construe mention of the elimination of barriers to transracial adoption as
referring to state holding statutes or to the actions of state actors in adop-
tion agencies or state child welfare departments. The subsidy thus would
meet Hopwood's stringent requirements and pass the first prong of strict
scrutiny.
If the subsidy passes this first prong of strict scrutiny review, it will
then be scrutinized against the second prong: whether it is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve its goal. In order to make such a showing, a state would
probably have to provide evidence that the child with whom the subsidy
would travel has a special need that makes her hard to place and that a
reasonable but unsuccessful effort has been made to place the child with-
out the provision of such assistance. Such data would show that the state
has a compelling governmental interest in placing this child because her
special characteristic, race, is directly correlated to the difficulty the state
faces in placing her.
A state also could provide data demonstrating that state action has
contributed to the longer waiting periods experienced by black children,
such as the existence, in the present or recent-past, of holding statutes
leading to longer waiting periods for minority children. 9 In addition,
both black children awaiting adoption and nonblack persons wishing to
adopt black children suffer racial discrimination when transracial adop-
tions are denied or delayed. To the extent that courts take note of the
number of persons and groups affected by the racial discrimination impli-
cated in a given case, they may view this fact as indicating an enhanced
need for remedial measures to be taken.
Under Hopwood, without evidence of present racial discrimination,
the provision of the federal adoption subsidy to parents adopting black
188. See supra Section III.A.
189. Though many other factors will be contemplated in the narrow tailoring analysis, they
vill be addressed in detail in the subsequent discussion of Wittmer because, under Hopwood,
the greater hurdle appears to be overcoming the first prong of strict scrutiny.
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children would be vulnerable to a charge of government utilization of an
unconstitutional racial classification. The statute could be reconceptual-
ized, however, to allow its use in states in which a showing of a remedial
purpose would be difficult. Such would be the case, for example, in those
states that had never implemented holding polices. The language of the
statute could be altered by omitting the race-based "special needs" cate-
gory and replacing it with a race-neutral "hard-to-place" or
"underadopted" category. These alternative terms could include all chil-
dren who are not placed with adopted families. This type of categoriza-
tion would change the subsidy from a race-conscious remedy to a facially
neutral one, satisfying a court's demand for narrow tailoring of remedies
while at the same time targeting children in need of homes.
Lastly, Hopwood shifted the burden of proof from plaintiff to defen-
dant by requiring the University to show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the Caucasian plaintiffs would not have been admitted to the
University of Texas Law School even had applicants of all races been
treated equally. An analogous challenge to the constitutionality of the
subsidy could be brought by a white child alleging that since a family
adopting her would not be given the subsidy, she was disadvantaged rela-
tive to black children whose adoptive families would receive the subsidy.
Alternatively, the child could argue that she had not been given the bene-
fit of having the subsidy travel with her, resulting in her having waited
longer to be adopted than a similarly situated black child would have had
to wait. Under Hopwood, it would appear that a state defending its pro-
vision of the subsidy to families adopting black children would have to
show that the white child denied the subsidy was not harmed by this prac-
tice-that is, that her chances of being adopted had not been or would
not be affected by the provision of the subsidy to another child. Adoption
placement does not involve direct competition in the same way that
school admissions do. The decision to adopt one child over another can
be based on a variety of factors. Furthermore, while schools whose ad-
missions policies are challenged may be forced to reveal the criteria by
which they make their admissions decisions and to judge all students by
the same standard, the decisions of adoptive parents, who are not state
actors, cannot be subject to the same scrutiny. Such persons need not de-
lineate the characteristics they sought in a child nor prove that they
judged each prospective adopted child against the same predetermined
standards. Furthermore, since many parents are seeking to adopt chil-
dren of a particular race, and white children are in greater "demand," the
existence of the subsidy probably would not affect a white child's chances
of being adopted. It is unlikely that a family would choose to adopt a
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black child over a white one solely because of the availability of the sub-
sidy.
In sum, despite the high barrier to survival of race-conscious remedial
programs under Hopwood, the federal adoption subsidy would be able to
survive challenge. By showing that race illegitimately had played a part in
the placement decisions made in many states, whether because of the ac-
tions of biased child-placement workers or because of the existence of
holding policies, the provision of the federal adoption subsidy as a means
of redressing racially discriminatory state action could be justified.
If Wittmer, rather than Hopwood, were embraced as the law of the
land, the federal adoption subsidy would be subject to a slightly different
analysis. Were Wittmer to govern, grounds other than the redress of past
discrimination by state actors would suffice to show a compelling gov-
ernment interest in providing the race-conscious federal adoption sub-
sidy. First, there is a dramatic statistical disparity between the waiting pe-
riods faced by and the placement rates of minority children and white
children. Furthermore, children are dependent beings who can neither
determine nor safeguard their own interests. Psychologists have indicated
that children need direct, intimate, and continuous care that can be pro-
vided by parents and that the parent-child relationship is necessary for
the proper social adaptation and psychological development of the
child.91 A child's unique sense of time-one which, unlike an adult's, is
based on the urgency of her emotional needs rather than a time period's
actual duration-makes rapid permanent placement an urgent need.19 In
addition, the state is responsible for children in its care and should take
all possible measures to remove children from the foster system and
place them in adoptive homes as quickly as possible, especially given the
evidence that it is very difficult to find families willing to adopt older
children. Finally, as discussed above, racially discriminatory state action
has contributed to the disproportionately long waiting periods endured
by black children. Given these facts, there would seem to be a compelling
state interest in the provision of the federal adoption subsidy.
The goal of encouraging the placement of black children is more
likely to be accepted under Wittmer than under Hopwood. While the
Hopwood court viewed race-conscious remedies as legitimate only if they
were designed to address the current effects of past discrimination, the
Wittmer court upheld an affirmative action measure based on the impor-
tance of the goal being pursued. Just as the relationship between the use
of affirmative action measures to the success of the penological strategies
used by a prison led the Wittmer court to find the measures taken to be
190. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 8-40.
191. See id. at 41-46.
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constitutional, a court could find that a critical end is served by the provi-
sion of the federal adoption subsidy.192 Although the Supreme Court has
never recognized the placement of children in permanent homes as a
compelling governmental interest, the subsidy's placement goal is likely
to be found acceptable because Wittmer indicates that a finding of legiti-
macy is both context- and situation-specific.
Courts scrutinizing the constitutionality of the adoption subsidy
would surely focus on substance over form in an effort to ascertain the
true purpose of the subsidy. Nevertheless, a court would likely come to
the following conclusions on the narrowness of tailoring of the subsidy.
The subsidy addresses the problem it claims to address by making it pos-
sible for a greater number of minority children in need of homes to re-
ceive permanent placements. The subsidy is flexible, and does not entail
any type of a rigid quota or fixed quantity set-aside. It provides forward-
looking relief, is limited in extent and is not over-inclusive-if, in a given
year, there are no minority children who need help being placed, no sub-
sidies will be distributed on the basis of race. The subsidy in no way pro-
vides a windfall for non-deserving minority children. The application of
the subsidy is also subject to administrative review, as states are periodi-
cally required to report on the program's success and to identify the
beneficiaries of the program.
In the narrow tailoring analysis, it also would be noted that the sub-
sidy is distinguishable from many race-based classifications because it ap-
plies to hard-to-place children of all races. The special needs definition is
more race-neutral than other possible means of facilitating the placement
of black children, since it identifies other children, such as older or handi-
capped children, and includes them within the hard-to-place category.
Furthermore, the subsidy targets one of the most significant barriers to
adoption by black adults, financial constraints. In an important sense,
provision of the subsidy levels the playing field and gives adults of all
races an opportunity to adopt a child. Another indication of narrow tai-
loring is the fact that in benefiting minority children in need of homes the
subsidy does not burden any other group. That the subsidy does not cre-
ate a disadvantaged class or group of people would be viewed favorably
by a court.
It must be acknowledged, however, that though the subsidy is facially
neutral and appears to apply to any adult wishing to adopt a child with a
condition making her difficult to place, it may be the case that in reality
the subsidy is allocated primarily to poor black families wanting to adopt
minority children. The existence of the adoption subsidy has not pre-
vented placement decision-makers averse to transracial adoption from
192. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996).
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rejecting white families trying to adopt black children. In a practical
sense, provision of the adoption subsidy is a way to ensure that homes
are found for minority children regardless of the biases of placement de-
cision-makers. Both social workers who feel that insufficient efforts have
been made to locate black families for waiting black children and social
workers who prioritize child placement over racial considerations can be
satisfied by the adoption subsidy. Regardless of their preferences re-
garding the race of adults adopting black children, child-placement deci-
sion-makers do in fact want to help black children be placed.
Nevertheless, if the federal adoption subsidy has tended to be used
largely as a mechanism to encourage more black adults to adopt and has
been given almost exclusively to blacks, it is vulnerable to challenge by
nonminority adults.'93 There appears to have been little protest against
the receipt of the subsidy by whites adopting transracially. Given the vo-
cal opposition of race-matching proponents to transracial adoption, this
fact suggests that in practice the subsidy is seldom given to such whites.
Though the subsidy attempts to encourage the adoption of black children
without regard to the race of the adoptive parents, strongly held feelings
about the importance of race hinder its effectiveness. As the discussion of
the Multiethnic Placement Act has shown, it is extremely difficult to pre-
vent the illegitimate use of racial considerations by placement decision-
makers. In applying strict scrutiny to the federal adoption subsidy, a
court would consider whether or not the subsidy is indeed conferred al-
most exclusively upon black adults.
The negative ramifications of discrimination against nonblack adults
wishing to adopt would be countered by the fact that the subsidy applies
to all hard-to-place children-handicapped, minority, and older children
alike. White adults are not prevented from adopting older, handicapped,
or other nonminority special needs children. Therefore, the inclusion of
minority children among those covered by the subsidy neither creates a
disadvantaged class of nor burdens nonminority children.
In sum, the subsidy will be found narrowly tailored under the princi-
ples expressed in either Hopwood or Wittmer because it is clearly di-
rected toward the compelling government interest in finding homes for
hard-to-place children. The federal adoption subsidy, then, would likely
pass constitutional muster if either Hopwood or Wittmer ultimately pre-
vails as law of the land.
193. Another class likely to have standing to challenge the subsidy is white children who
are not adopted and do not benefit from the subsidy. They, however, do not present a foresee-
able problem, since white children without a handicap are readily adopted in society and thus
have no need for the benefit the subsidy confers.




Fifty percent of the children in the United States waiting to be
adopted are children of color, double the proportion of minority children
in the country's population. On average, minority children wait twice as
long as nonminority children before being matched with a parent. Al-
though there are long lists of white adults wanting to adopt them, minor-
ity children languish in foster or institutional care. This is in part the re-
sult of an overly flexible "best interests" standard governing placement
outcomes. The best interests standard makes race a relevant-but-not-
decisive factor in child-placement determinations, a fact that can be
taken advantage of by bureaucrats opposed to transracial adoption.
Bureaucratic resistance to transracial adoption hurts black children
because it precludes or delays permanent placements. The federal adop-
tion subsidy is a permissible solution to the difficulties of placing minority
children in adoptive homes. The provision of a subsidy to persons
adopting black children may seem to perpetuate government reliance on
racial classification. However, the federal adoption subsidy is an effec-
tive, laudable, and constitutional mechanism for the location of perma-
nent homes for minority and other hard-to-place children in the foster
system.
Whether the principles of Hopwood or Wittmer are applied, the fed-
eral adoption subsidy would likely pass constitutional muster. The con-
tinued use of the federal adoption subsidy to address the disproportion-
ately large numbers of black children waiting to be adopted should be
advocated.

